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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND THE 
FATE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
JOHN J. DONOHUE∗
ABSTRACT 
In his dissenting opinion in Glossip v. Gross, Justice Breyer 
attempted to give content to the Supreme Court’s prior command in 
Atkins v. Virginia that unless the imposition of the death penalty 
“measurably contributes to one or both of [the legitimate penological 
goals of deterrence and retribution], it ‘is nothing more than the 
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,’ and hence 
an unconstitutional punishment.” Justice Breyer’s opinion illuminates 
the central role that empirical studies have played in death penalty 
litigation since Furman v. Georgia on issues ranging from the lack of 
deterrence associated with the death penalty; to racial and ethnic bias 
in its administration; to the extensive delays, cost, errors, and arbitrary 
implementation; and to the failure to limit capital punishment to the 
worst of the worst offenders. 
Two months after Glossip, the battle over the empirical evaluation 
of capital punishment played out in the contentious 4-3 decision in State 
v. Santiago, in which the Connecticut Supreme Court found the death
penalty unconstitutional in the wake of the state legislature’s prior
prospective abolition. The bitter judicial contention in both Glossip and
Santiago over the evaluation of evidence of racial and ethnic bias and
an array of other empirical issues highlights both the critical
importance of empirical analysis to the fate of the death penalty and
the difficulty that many judges have in properly evaluating statistical
evidence. The statistically unsupportable attempts by the State’s expert
to undermine the overwhelming evidence of racial disparity in capital
charging in Connecticut underscores that highly flawed statistical
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evidence will often be pressed upon (or seized upon by) judges who 
may be ideologically inclined to accept work that true experts would 
readily reject. If the Supreme Court is able to effectively appraise the 
best empirical work in applying the Atkins standard, it is difficult to see 
how the death penalty could be sustained as a constitutional 
punishment. 
Unless the imposition of the death penalty “measurably contributes 
to one or both of these goals [deterrence and retribution], it ‘is nothing 
more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and 
suffering,’ and hence an unconstitutional punishment.” 
– Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318–19 (2002) (emphasis added). 
INTRODUCTION 
The decline of capital punishment in the United States is evident in 
the numbers. In 2015, only 49 death sentences were issued in the entire 
country (down from a peak of 315 in 1996), and only 28 convicts were 
executed (down from a peak of 98 in 1999).1 Not only were these the 
lowest numbers in decades, but nineteen states have formally abolished 
capital punishment, up from twelve in 2004, and many other states have 
not executed anyone for years. Only four states executed more than 
one convict in 2015—Texas (13), Georgia (6), Missouri (5), and Florida 
(2).2 But even Texas only handed down two death sentences in all of 
2015.3 
The Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia4 emphasized that the 
infrequency of application of the death penalty with no convincing 
basis for distinguishing the few who are sentenced to death from the 
many who avoid that penalty rendered capital punishment freakish, 
arbitrary, ineffectual, and hence unconstitutional. The reduction in the 
use of capital punishment in the last few years invites a similar critique 
of the modern capital regime. Even though the U.S. population has 
grown by over 50 percent in the last 45 years,5 fewer death sentences 
were handed out in the last decade than in the decade preceding the 
Furman decision. With this declining use of the death penalty, the 
 
 1.  Death Penalty Use in 2015 Declines Sharply, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR, 
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2015YrEnd.pdf (last visited February 10, 2016). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 5.  U.S. Population, http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/us-population/ (last 
visited June 15, 2016). 
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Supreme Court will have to decide whether the trend should be 
allowed to play itself out or whether the time is right for a momentous 
decision that goes beyond Furman by rendering the death penalty 
unconstitutional. 
The great eighteenth century Italian criminologist Cesare Beccaria 
wrote that the death penalty could not be a legitimate punishment 
because it furthers no acceptable penological objective more 
effectively than life imprisonment.6 The U.S. Supreme Court has 
essentially embraced this Beccarian framework by stating that there 
are only two permissible penological objectives of the death penalty—
deterrence and retribution—and, as quoted above, the Court in Atkins 
v. Virginia asserted that capital punishment cannot be sustained unless 
it “measurably contributes” to one or both of these objectives.7 Whether 
the death penalty lives or dies will depend on how courts assess the 
growing empirical literature highlighting the lack of benefits associated 
with capital punishment and the burgeoning list of problems with its 
use. 
Two judicial opinions issued during the summer of 2015 previewed 
the coming battle over the constitutionality of capital punishment. 
Both Justice Breyer’s dissent in Glossip v. Gross,8 and a concurring 
opinion from the Connecticut Supreme Court in State v. Santiago9 
relied heavily on empirical studies to make the case that the death 
penalty could no longer be deemed a constitutionally valid punishment. 
At the same time, both cases stimulated harsh attacks on the need for 
and proper interpretation of the empirical analysis of the death 
penalty.10 These judicial skirmishes illustrate the difficulties that some 
judges have had in separating out the wheat from the chaff in 
evaluating empirical studies of the death penalty. 
 
 6.  Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishment, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS PROJECT 38, 
http://thefederalistpapers.integratedmarket.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/ 
Cesare-Beccaria-On-Crimes-and-Punishment.pdf (last visited June 13, 2016). 
 7.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (emphasis added) (quoting Enmund v. 
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)).  
 8.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755, reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 20 (2015) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 9.  State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 140, reconsideration denied, 319 Conn. 912 (2015) (Norcott 
and McDonald, Js., concurring). 
 10.  See infra text accompanying notes 58, 97, 108; Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2748–49 (regarding 
Justice Scalia’s criticisms of Breyer’s stance on the empirical literature); infra text accompanying 
notes 101, 117; Glossip at 2751–53 (regarding Justice Thomas’ criticisms of the same); see generally 
Santiago, 318 Conn. at 231 (Rogers C. J., dissenting); id. at 341–88 (Zarella, J., dissenting); id. at 
388–412 (Espinosa, J. dissenting). 
DONAHUE (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/2016  4:04 PM 
54 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 11:1&2 
It is likely that the fate of the death penalty in the U.S. will depend 
on whether the Atkins v. Virginia mandate that capital punishment 
must measurably contribute to deterrence or retribution is seriously 
and intelligently applied in future court challenges. If it is, the death 
penalty could well be deemed unconstitutional—as it was in Santiago11 
and as Justice Breyer suggested it should be in Glossip.12 If the 
command of Atkins is ignored (or disavowed) or the type of empirical 
malpractice that is sometimes offered by the defenders of the death 
penalty receives judicial sanction, then the death penalty will live on, 
immunized from the mounting evidence of its increasingly troubling 
administration. 
This paper will address how empirical evidence has and will 
continue to shape the debate over the desirability and constitutionality 
of the death penalty in the United States at both the state and federal 
level. Part I begins with a brief review of some prominent contributions 
on the issue of whether capital punishment deters the commission of 
murder, and highlights how the National Research Council (NRC) 
report of 2012 on deterrence and the death penalty has essentially 
foreclosed the argument that the death penalty measurably contributes 
to deterrence. The section ends with a detailed description of how 
Justice Scalia continued to cite discredited studies on deterrence as 
though they had been endorsed rather than specifically rejected by the 
NRC report. 
Part II addresses the question of whether empirical evidence could 
support the position that capital punishment measurably contributes to 
retribution. Drawing on work that I prepared in serving as an expert in 
a challenge to the Connecticut death penalty, I discuss the finding of 
my study that the Connecticut death penalty has not limited death 
sentences to the worst of the worst offenses, and respond to criticisms 
of my methodology offered by Justices Scalia and Thomas in Glossip. 
Looking at how capital punishment has played out over the last four 
decades, Justice Breyer noted that over 75 percent of the 183 inmates 
sentenced to death throughout the United States in 1978 escaped the 
executioner.13 This raises serious doubts about the claim that capital 
punishment plausibly furthers a retributive goal. Certainly, one would 
not expect such an outcome from a process that rationally separates 
out the few who will die from the many who will not. 
 
 11.  State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 140, reconsideration denied, 319 Conn. 912 (2015).  
 12.  Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2769–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 13.  Id. at 2768. 
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Part III discusses yet another aspect of arbitrariness in capital 
outcomes that undermines its retributive goal—the influence of race. I 
briefly review the proliferating empirical evidence on race disparities 
in capital sentencing, and then discuss the battle between me and 
Connecticut’s opposing expert over whether minority on white 
murders were capitally charged by Connecticut prosecutors at 
significantly higher rates than minority on minority murders.14 
Interestingly, the expert witness for Connecticut first acknowledged 
this racial disparity in capital charging, then tried to offer at trial a 
regression undermining this view based on his mistaken coding of a key 
explanatory variable, and subsequently engaged in an array of dubious 
efforts to obscure the racial disparity that was clearly evident in the 
correct version of the regression that he had presented to the court. 
The example underscores the dangers that lurk when judges are 
unable to weed out inadequate empirical work, and the discussion 
throughout provides an array of illustrations of how judges have 
offered invalid statistical evidence, made erroneous factual claims in 
the face of valid contradictory evidence, or simply ignored cogent 
empirical findings to defend the death penalty. Part IV offers some 
concluding remarks on the likely fate of the death penalty if the Atkins 
standard is seriously applied in the face of the current empirical 
evidence on the administration of capital punishment. 
 
I. DETERRENCE 
Cesare Beccaria, writing in 1764 (at age 26!) in his famed treatise 
On Crimes and Punishments argued that all aspects of criminal justice, 
including whether the death penalty deters crime, needed to “be solved 
with that geometrical precision which the mist of sophistry, the 
seduction of eloquence, and the timidity of doubt are unable to 
resist.”15 For Beccaria, the answer was clear: because life imprisonment 
“has in it all that is necessary to deter the most hardened and 
determined,” the death penalty could not be a just expression of state 
power since the death penalty is not a more effective deterrent than life 
imprisonment.16 Indeed, Beccaria feared that capital punishment might 
 
 14.  “Minority on white murders” are cases where a minority defendant has murdered a 
white victim. “White” refers to a non-Hispanic white individual, and “minority” refers to all 
others. 
 15.  See Beccaria, supra note 6, at 19. 
 16.  Id. at 39. 
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independently decrease deterrence by making citizens callous to the 
taking of another’s life with “the example of barbarity it affords.”17 
Ultimately, Beccarian thinking has come to influence the belief of 
a majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court that, if a death penalty 
regime is to be constitutional, it must serve a legitimate penological 
interest by advancing the goal of deterrence or retribution.18 Unless the 
imposition of the death penalty “measurably contributes to one or both 
of these goals [deterrence and retribution], the Supreme Court has 
stated, it ‘is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition 
of pain and suffering,’ and hence an unconstitutional punishment.”19 
For our purposes, the operative word in the above quote is 
“measurably,” which signals the central role that empirical analysis 
must play in assessing the death penalty’s constitutionality under the 
Atkins standard. We begin with the first possible justification for using 
capital punishment: deterrence. Although Beccaria was confident in his 
prediction that the death penalty would not deter—just as some judges 
today are confident in their opposing prediction—we no longer need 
to rely solely on intuition. Instead, we can statistically evaluate crime 
data using modern econometric techniques to see if the Atkins 
standard can be satisfied. 
A. The Sellin Study Finding No Evidence of Deterrence 
The first serious empirical effort to assess the deterrence of the 
death penalty was undertaken by the sociologist Thorsten Sellin.20 
Based on a careful but simple comparison of the evolution of homicide 
rates in contiguous states from 1920 to 1963, Sellin buttressed the 
Beccarian doubt that the imposition of the death penalty would 
generate any net deterrent effect on murder.21 Sellin’s work may have 
been one of the many factors that contributed to the waning reliance 
on capital punishment, as executions virtually ceased in the late 1960s.22 
 
 17.  Id. at 40. Beccaria’s work influenced Jeremy Bentham, who agreed that the death 
penalty could not be a just punishment for the reasons that Beccaria articulated. Hugo Adam 
Bedau, Bentham’s Utilitarian Critique of the Death Penalty, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1033, 
at 1036–37, 1044, 1051 (1983). 
 18.  See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). 
 19.  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)).  
 20.  Thorsten Sellin, Homicides in Retentionist and Abolitionist States, CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 135 (Thorsten Sellin ed., 1967). 
 21.  Id. at 138 (finding no evidence that capital punishment deters homicide). 
 22.  See M. Watt Espy & John Ortiz Smykla, Executions in The United States, 1608-2002: The 
Espy File (ICPSR 8451), NACJD, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/8451 
(last updated Nov 4, 2005). 
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In 1972, the Supreme Court’s decision in Furman ruled that existing 
death penalty statutes were unconstitutional.23 Although Furman 
appeared to be a setback for supporters of capital punishment, the 
decision produced a backlash that stimulated support for the death 
penalty, both in state legislatures around the country and in certain 
academic circles.24 In 1975, Isaac Ehrlich’s econometric analysis of 
national time-series data was used to claim that each execution saved 
eight lives.25 A year later, Solicitor General Robert Bork presented a 
highly laudatory assessment of Ehrlich’s work (written by his assistant 
Frank Easterbrook) to the Supreme Court,26 and the Court, while 
claiming not to have relied on the empirical evidence, ended the death 
penalty moratorium when it upheld various capital punishment 
statutes in Gregg v. Georgia and related cases.27 
B. Ehrlich Finds Deterrence But the NRC Disagrees 
The Bork-Easterbrook brief highlighted the potential weaknesses 
of Sellin’s simple cross-state comparisons, which did not control for 
other factors that might have been changing differently in the 
treatment and control states (that is, the states adopting the death 
penalty and the matched states that did not).28 Because Ehrlich’s 
regression study introduced some controls, it seemed at the time to be 
an improvement over the Sellin study. Forty years of experience have 
now taught us that a poorly designed regression study can easily give 
the wrong answer to any causal question, and the complexity of 
Ehrlich’s particular approach obscured its abundant flaws to all but the 
most sophisticated analysts. 
 
 23.  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 24.  See LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE: 
ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 90 (Univ. of N.C. Press 1992) (documenting the rapid 
legislative enactment of new state death penalty statutes and increased public support for the 
death penalty in the wake of Furman). 
 25.  Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Matter of Life and Death, 
65 AM. ECON. REV., at 398 (1975). 
 26.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 233–34 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 27.  See id. at 185. In Gregg, Justice Stewart stated, “Although some of the studies suggest 
that the death penalty may not function as a significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties, 
there is no convincing empirical evidence either supporting or refuting this view.” Id. Yet he then 
asserted, “We may nevertheless assume safely that there are murderers, such as those who act in 
passion, for whom the threat of death has little or no deterrent effect. But for many others, the 
death penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterrent.” Id. Justice Stewart did not clarify whether 
he believed that murders would increase if convicted murderers who might otherwise be executed 
instead received sentences of life without parole and, if so, on what basis this might be safely 
assumed. 
 28.  See Sellin, supra note 20, at 135. 
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The injection of Ehrlich’s conclusions into the legal and public 
policy arenas, coupled with the academic debate over Ehrlich’s 
methods, led the National Academy of Sciences to convene a panel of 
experts that issued a 1978 report concluding that Ehrlich’s work in 
support of a deterrent effect of capital punishment was unpersuasive.29 
Over the next two decades, as a series of conflicting academic papers 
were published on the deterrence question, the rate of executions 
gradually increased, albeit to levels much lower than those seen in the 
first half of the twentieth century.30 While some improvidently claimed 
that there was strong evidence that the death penalty deterred 
murder,31 the growing recognition of the dramatic weaknesses of the 
pro-deterrence literature led to the release of a second National 
Academy of Sciences panel report in 2012 entitled “DETERRENCE AND 
THE DEATH PENALTY,”32 which again found no valid statistical support 
for the claim of deterrence. 
It is now widely accepted among top-flight empirical scholars that 
not a single study credibly supports the view that capital punishment as 
administered anywhere in the United States provides any added 
deterrent beyond that afforded by a sentence of life imprisonment.33 
The indictment by the NRC report of the studies claiming to find a 
deterrent effect of capital punishment applied both to studies that 
examined the death penalty throughout the United States, as well as 
 
 29.  NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE 
EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES, 59–62 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978). 
While the validity of Sellin’s study depended on how well he selected matching states that did and 
did not use the death penalty, at least he was looking at plausibly meaningful data. Ehrlich’s initial 
study was focused on national time series data, which was inherently defective since it had no way 
to link changes in executions to homicides in the relevant states. See John J. Donohue, Empirical 
Evaluation of Law: The Dream and the Nightmare, 17 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 313, 311–20 (2015). 
 30.  See Espy & Smykla, supra note 22. 
 31.  See discussion infra accompanying note 40. 
 32.  COMM. ON DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, COMM. ON LAW AND JUSTICE, 
DIV. OF BEHAVIORAL AND SOC. SCIS AND EDUC., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE 
AND THE DEATH PENALTY 3 (Daniel S. Nagin & John V. Peppers eds., 2012) [hereinafter COMM. 
ON DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY]. The NRC panel included an array of impressive 
scholars with differing political beliefs, who reached a unanimous conclusion regardless of their 
prior position on the death penalty. In particular, James Q. Wilson, the former Ronald Reagan 
Professor of Public Policy at the Pepperdine University School of Public Policy, who had 
previously written in support of the death penalty, joined the final report’s conclusion that no 
existing study credibly supported the deterrent effect of the death penalty. 
The particular value of reports emanating from the NAS has been specifically acknowledged in 
the federal judiciary: “As the National Academy of Sciences was recognized by experts for both 
parties as the ‘most prestigious’ scientific association in this country, we will accordingly cite to its 
opinion where appropriate.” Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 735 (2005). 
 33.  See generally Donohue, supra note 29, at 313. 
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studies that limited their focus to individual states. Specifically, the 
report noted that whether one looked at Texas, which vigorously 
applied the death penalty in the 1990s and 2000s; California, a state that 
sentenced many convicts to death but which has only executed 13 over 
the last 30 years; or New York, which has executed no one over this 
period; the murder rates have moved roughly comparably. In fact, while 
all three states had roughly similar murder rates in the early 1990s, the 
only one of the three not to execute anyone–New York–has enjoyed a 
substantially lower murder rate since the time that Texas executions 
rose sharply in the late 1990s.34 
C. Justice Scalia Clings to the Deterrence Argument Despite the NRC 
Report 
But as educated judgment was taking a dim view of the studies 
purporting to show a deterrent effect of the death penalty, some judges 
were having a difficult time sorting out the wheat from the chaff. In the 
face of the unanimous judgment of the NRC panel that Justice Breyer 
cited in support of his view that the death penalty is not likely to be a 
greater deterrent than life imprisonment, Justice Scalia disagreed, 
saying, “[i]t seems very likely to me, and there are statistical studies that 
say so.”35 This disagreement mimicked a previous exchange between 
Justices Scalia and Stevens in the case of Baze v. Rees,36 in which Justice 
Stevens cited research by Donohue and Wolfers and others to justify 
the claim that “there remains no reliable statistical evidence that 
capital punishment in fact deters potential offenders.”37 Justice Scalia 
replied by saying that Justice Stevens’ conclusions “are not supported 
by the available data.”38 Justice Scalia supported his assertion with a 
cite to a single article by Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule that was 
not an empirical evaluation of the deterrent effect of the death penalty 
(although it did list some such articles), but rather a philosophical 
discussion of what would be appropriate policy if the death penalty 
 
 34.  See Figure 3-3 in COMM. ON DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 32. 
Similar evidence of the lack of deterrence from the operation of the death penalty based on 
studies from around the world is summarized in ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH 
PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 423–25 (5th ed. 2015). 
 35.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2746, reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 20 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
concurring).  
 36.  Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008). 
 37.  Id. at 79 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and 
Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2005) 
[hereinafter Uses and Abuses]. 
 38.  Id. at 89 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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were a deterrent.39 Sunstein soon responded to Justice Scalia’s claims 
by stating directly in a piece with Justin Wolfers that “[i]n short, the 
best reading of the accumulated data is that they do not establish a 
deterrent effect of the death penalty.”40 Apparently, neither the 
Sunstein and Wolfers correction of Justice Scalia, my own published 
discussion of this correction of the Justice,41 nor the 2012 release of the 
NRC report42 moved Justice Scalia to reconsider his reliance on the 
Sunstein and Vermeule article because this was one of the three 
“statistical studies” that Justice Scalia again offered to rebut Justice 
Breyer’s claim in Glossip.43 
The two additional studies that Justice Scalia provided in Glossip 
to support his intuition that the death penalty is a deterrent44—one by 
Zimmerman45 and one by Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, & Shepherd 
(“DRS”)46—were specifically identified in the NRC report as studies 
that should “not be used to inform” discussion about the deterrent 
value of the death penalty.47 Indeed, if one merely types these four 
names into Google, it brings up Donohue and Wolfers, “Uses and 
Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate,”48 which, 
along with the NRC report,49 and another Donohue and Wolfers’ 
article,50 catalogs a large array of problems with the Zimmerman and 
DRS studies.51 
Perhaps the simplest of these problems to articulate is that both the 
DRS and Zimmerman results were not statistically significant.52 
 
 39.  Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, 
Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 706 (2005). 
 40.  Cass R. Sunstein & Justin Wolfers, A Death Penalty Puzzle, THE WASH. POST (Jun. 30, 
2008) (emphasis added), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/29/AR 
2008062901476.html. 
 41.  See Donohue, supra note 29, at 37. 
 42.  COMM. ON DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 32, at 102.  
 43.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2748–49, reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 20 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Paul R. Zimmerman, State Executions, Deterrence, and the Incidence of Murder, 7 J. 
APPLIED ECON. 163 (2004).  
 46.  Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New 
Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 344 (2003). 
 47.  COMM. ON DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 33, at 102. 
 48.  See Donahue & Wolfers, Uses and Abuses, supra note 38, at 836–39. 
 49.  COMM. ON DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 33. 
 50.  John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Estimating the Impact of the Death Penalty on 
Murder, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 249 (2009) [hereinafter Impact of Death Penalty]. 
 51.  GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/search?q=Zimmerman+Dezhbakhsh+Rubin+ 
Shepherd (last visited Apr. 4, 2016). 
 52.  See Donohue & Wolfers, Impact of Death Penalty, supra note 50, at 30–31. This wasn’t 
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Moreover, the failure of both the DRS and Zimmerman studies to 
properly implement an econometric technique called “instrumental 
variables” led them to be specifically rejected by the NRC report 
because their instruments—and hence their findings—were not 
credible: “In general, the committee finds that the instruments 
proposed in the research are not credible and, as a result, this 
identification strategy has thus far failed to overcome the challenges to 
identifying a causal effect of the death penalty on homicide rates.”53 
While Justice Scalia remained untroubled by or oblivious to the 
issues raised in the NRC report, his recidivist pronouncements in 
Glossip after his missteps in Baze v. Rees are somewhat troubling.54 In 
the wake of the clear discrediting by a unanimous panel of the National 
Research Council of the two actual statistical studies that Justice Scalia 
relied on and the subsequent specific rejection of Justice Scalia’s 
conclusion by the lead author of a study he cited,55 one might have 
hoped that Justice Scalia would offer something more credible than an 
effectively unadorned claim of what “seem[ed] very likely”56 to him as 
a basis for ignoring a strong expert consensus. 
Although it is undoubtedly challenging for a judge to 
independently sort out the good from the bad statistical studies, all 
Justice Scalia needed to do was read the abstract of the NRC report, 
which Justice Breyer cited,57 to know he was treading on thin ice in 
 
the fault of the authors since, at the time they published, the correct approach for adjusting one’s 
standard errors by clustering had not been identified. Intuitively, the problem is that without 
clustering, the calculation of statistical significance assumes, incorrectly, that the observation for 
say, murder in Illinois in 2000 is independent of the levels of murders in Illinois a year later. In 
fact, these two observations are highly correlated so there is less independent information 
available to the researcher than appears. Clustering adjusts for this fact, which will reduce 
statistical significance. This effect was strong enough to undermine the DRS and Zimmerman 
findings. 
The need for clustering only became widely known in 2004 with the publication of Marianne 
Bertrand et al., How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates? 119 Q. J. 
ECON., at 249 (2004). Aneja, Donohue, and Zhang clearly establish that the standard errors in the 
panel data crime studies that Justice Scalia cites are way too small, thereby exaggerating estimates 
of statistical significance. See Abhay Aneja et al., The Impact of Right-to-Carry Laws and the NRC 
Report: Lessons for the Empirical Evaluation of Law and Policy, 13 AM. L. ECON. REV., at 565 
(2011); Abhay Aneja et al., The Impact of Right to Carry Laws and the NRC Report: The Latest 
Lessons for the Empirical Evaluation of Law and Policy, NBER WORKING PAPER NO. 18294 
(2012). 
 53.  COMM. ON DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 32, at 68. 
 54.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2746, reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 20 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 87 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 55.  See Sunstein & Wolfers, supra note 40. 
 56.  Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2748 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 57.  Id. at 2768 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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offering two discredited statistical studies. It is also not asking too much 
to expect a judge to at least acknowledge when the primary author of 
the article he is citing for a certain proposition has specifically 
disavowed that proposition. Citations to empirical studies are not 
supposed to be mere props to create an illusion of support for a judge’s 
untutored intuitions. 
Having parried with his junk science, Justice Scalia then thrusted at 
Justice Breyer with the charge that, because federal judges are shielded 
from violence that plagues other members of the community, Justice 
Breyer’s views on the death penalty reflect a “let-them-eat-cake 
obliviousness to the needs of others.”58 But, because Justice Breyer was 
being attentive to the best studies on the issue of deterrence while 
Scalia was not, the charge of “obliviousness” seems misdirected. 
Moreover, a majority of murder victims in the United States are black, 
59 so attentiveness to the needs of others might lead one to inquire 
about the attitude towards the death penalty of members of this racial 
group. In fact, most blacks oppose the death penalty, perhaps reflecting 
their realization that it both will not promote their safety and is 
administered in a discriminatory fashion.60 
Scalia’s pronouncements concerning deterrence and the death 
penalty seem to buttress Judge Richard Posner’s claim that Justice 
Scalia has a tendency to engage in “‘motivated thinking,’ the form of 
cognitive delusion that consists of credulously accepting the evidence 
that supports a preconception and of peremptorily rejecting the 
evidence that contradicts it.”61 Similarly, another academic critic (and 
former law clerk) has charged that Justice Scalia has an anti-scientific 
mindset that essentially believes that the quality of empirical studies is 
governed not by the dictates of scientific methodology but rather by 
how closely their findings conform to one’s previously held beliefs.62 
 
 58.  Id. at 2749 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 59.  Uniform Crime Reports: Expanded Homicide Data Table 1, FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2014/tables/expanded-homicide-data/expanded_homicide_data_table_1_murder_victims_ 
by_race_ethnicity_and_sex_2014.xls (last visited June 13, 2016). 
 60.  “A majority of African Americans (55%) oppose the death penalty . . . .” Gallup Poll: 
Support for Death Penalty Declines 2%, Opposition Reaches Highest Level in 43 Years, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6275 (last visited June 14, 2016). 
 61.  Richard Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, THE NEW REPUBLIC Aug. 23, 2012, 
https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism. 
 62.  As Harvard law professor Bruce Hay, Scalia’s former law clerk, recently wrote, 
“Antonin Scalia generally detested science. It threatened everything he believed in. . . . Scientists 
should be listened to only if they supported conservative causes, for example dubious 
studies purporting to demonstrate that same-sex parenting is harmful to children.” Bruce Hay, I 
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This is an unappealing and dangerous judicial trait—particularly in a 
matter of life and death—but unfortunately one that other strong 
judicial supporters of the death penalty seem to share.63 
The bottom line is that decades of research examining the impact 
of capital punishment on the rate of murder have been unable to satisfy 
the constitutional standard quoted above from Atkins v. Virginia that 
capital punishment “measurably contribute” to the legitimate 
penological goal of deterrence. If the Atkins command is to be retained 
and given effect, the only basis on which a death penalty could be 
sustained would be on the grounds that it “measurably contributes” to 
retribution. 
II. RETRIBUTION 
The most unrelenting invocation of retribution as the rationale for 
the death penalty came from Immanuel Kant, who stated: 
[W]hoever has committed Murder, must die. There is, in this case, no 
juridical substitute or surrogate that can be given or taken for the 
satisfaction of Justice. There is no Likeness or proportion between 
Life, however painful, and Death; and therefore there is no Equality 
between the crime of Murder and the retaliation of it but what is 
judicially accomplished by the execution of the Criminal.64 
Ironically, Justice Scalia tried to counter Justice Breyer’s contention 
in Glossip that the death penalty was unconstitutional by noting that 
Kant “believe[d] that death is the only just punishment for taking a 
life.” 
The irony is two-fold. First, Scalia famously stated, “[W]e don’t 
have the same moral and legal framework as the rest of the world, and 
 
Thought I Could Reason With Antonin Scalia: A More Naive Young Fool Never Drew Breath, 
SALON (Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.salon.com/2016/02/27/i_thought_i_could_reason 
_with_antonin_scalia_a_more_naive_young_fool_never_drew_breath/ 
 63.  See infra text accompanying notes 101–107, 113–125 (discussing Justice Thomas’ use of 
empirical evidence) and text accompanying notes 190, 198 (discussing the trial court decisions in 
McCleskey v. Kemp and in In Re. Death Penalty Disparity Claims, Connecticut Superior Court, 
October 11, 2013). 
 64.  IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 125 (W. Hastie trans., Clark 1887) 
(emphasis in original). One hesitates to be sharply critical of a philosopher such as Kant, who 
made a number of important contributions to moral theory, but any fundamentalist notion that 
there must be “equality” between crime and punishment is so nonsensical that it needs to be 
aggressively dismissed. We do not rape rapists, nor do we torture torturers. Thankfully, any such 
inclination to punish in this fashion would be quickly, and appropriately, dismissed on Eighth 
Amendment grounds. 
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never have. If you told the framers of the Constitution that [what] we’re 
after is to . . . do something that will be just like Europe, they would 
have been appalled.”65 Justice Scalia failed to explain his rationale for 
why European legal concepts would be irrelevant to American 
constitutional law when Kant’s views on the death penalty would merit 
citation in a constitutional case.66 
Second, and perhaps more importantly for our purposes, Scalia’s 
statement provides an opportunity to highlight how even the most 
basic descriptive statistics can illustrate the weakness of theoretical 
arguments. Rather than buttressing the modern death penalty, the 
reference to Kant only shows how orthogonal the thinking of that 
eighteenth century German philosopher is to the current legal debate 
in America. If the only punishment for taking a life were execution—
the Kantian prescription—the state would have to kill over 14,000 
individuals every year.67 This is not only unconstitutional (the Supreme 
Court emphatically ruled in Woodson v. North Carolina that any such 
mandatory application of the death penalty for murders would be 
constitutionally barred68), but more importantly the American people 
would never stand for such levels of state-sponsored killing. In the 
modern era of capital punishment (since Furman), the U.S. has never 
executed more than 98 (in 1999) in a single year and only executed 28 
in 2015.69 This empirical evidence on the relative infrequency of 
executions in the U.S. compared to what would occur under Kantian 
principles of appropriate punishment for murderers underscores how 
Kant’s thinking on this issue could scarcely be less informative on any 
question about the modern death penalty. 
In the decidedly non-Kantian world of the U.S. death penalty when 
the death penalty must be reserved for the worst of the worst 
 
 65.  American University, Transcript of Debate Between Justices Scalia and Breyer on 
Foreign Law, FREE REPUBLIC, (Jan. 13, 2005), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus 
/news/1352357/posts. 
 66.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U. S. 551, 624–28 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
“foreign sources” should “be rejected out of hand”).  
 67.  “In 2014, the estimated number of murders in the nation was 14,249.” Uniform Crime 
Reports: 2014 Crime in the United States, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/offenses-
known-to-law-enforcement/murder. 
 68.  Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280–81 (1976). 
 69.  See Searchable Execution Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/views-executions?exec_name_1=&exec_year%5B 
%5D=2015&sex=All&sex_1=All&federal=All&foreigner=All&juvenile=All&volunteer=All 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2016). 
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offenders,70 the use of the death penalty can only measurably 
contribute to retribution if those who are the most egregious or 
culpable offenders—the most deserving of death—are executed, and 
those who commit less egregious crimes, who are less deserving of 
death, will be spared. Of course, any retributive goal would be 
undermined if an excessive number of innocent individuals were 
executed, and Justice Breyer’s Glossip dissent discusses the uneasy 
facts concerning errors in capital convictions.71 
Killing innocent individuals, though, is not the only problem that 
can undermine the retributive goal of a capital regime. A number of 
factors subject to empirical investigation can also give content to the 
Supreme Court edict that a death penalty regime must provide a 
“meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [death] is 
imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”72 A capital regime 
could fail to measurably contribute to retribution if it did not limit the 
death penalty to the worst of the worst offenders, or if it was marred by 
racial or ethnic bias, or a reliance on any morally arbitrary categories 
in deciding who would be sentenced to death. Justice Breyer addressed 
all of these issues as he raised concerns about whether retribution could 
provide a constitutionally valid basis to uphold capital punishment.73 In 
Section III, we address the empirical literature on racial disparity. Now, 
we turn to the empirical evidence on whether capital punishment has 
been administered in a way that meaningfully furthers a rational 
retributive goal by limiting the death penalty to the worst of the worst 
offenders. 
A. Limiting the Death Penalty to the Worst of the Worst 
The Supreme Court has stated that “[c]apital punishment must be 
limited to those offenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most 
 
 70.  As Justice Breyer states in his Glossip dissent, “The Court has . . . sought to make the 
application of the death penalty less arbitrary by restricting its use to those whom Justice Souter 
called ‘the worst of the worst.’” Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2760, reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 20 
(2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J., 
dissenting)).  
 71.  Some “retributivists, while not opposed philosophically to capital punishment, oppose 
it because of increasing evidence (particularly in light of the DNA revolution) that innocent 
persons have been sentenced to death,” Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution in the 
Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573 (2004), or “because of proven racial discrimination in 
sentencing.” JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 54–55 n.12. (7th ed. 
LexisNexis 2015).). 
 72.  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring).  
 73.  Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2755 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most 
deserving of execution.’”74 As Justice Breyer noted in Glossip, “The 
Court has . . . sought to make the application of the death penalty less 
arbitrary by restricting its use to those whom Justice Souter called “the 
worst of the worst.’”75 
1. Evaluating Egregiousness of Crimes – Establishing Validity 
During litigation challenging the constitutionality of the 
Connecticut death penalty, I explored whether the Connecticut death 
penalty system was operating consistently with this command by 
analyzing the treatment of the 205 death-eligible cases in Connecticut 
between 1973 and 2007 to see if the nine that ended up with a sustained 
death sentence conformed to this narrowing requirement.76 
Specifically, I adhered to a well-developed literature in which coders 
were given summaries of fact patterns and asked to rate them along a 
category scale. Thorsten Sellin and Marvin Wolfgang initiated this 
literature in 1964 when they used judges, police officers, and college 
students to rate criminal acts.77 They found that the respondents were 
easily able to handle the rating tasks and that there was “considerable 
agreement among subgroups about both the relative ordering of 
criminal acts and the scale scores given.”78 
A decade later, these findings were replicated in “a more 
representative population” by Peter H. Rossi, Emily Waite, Christine E. 
Bose, and Richard E. Berk, who also noted that “the more highly 
educated and the younger respondents were, the more likely were their 
individual ratings of criminal acts to agree with the average computed 
for the entire sample.”79 Rossi et al. concluded that “the norms defining 
how serious various criminal acts are considered to be, are quite widely 
distributed among blacks and whites, males and females, high and low 
socioeconomic levels, and among levels of educational attainment.”80 
 
 74.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
319 (2002)).  
 75.  Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. at 163 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 76.  John J. Donohue III, An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System 
Since 1973: Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities?, 11 J. OF EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 637–96 (2014) [hereinafter An Empirical Evaluation]. 
 77.  THORSTEN SELLIN & MARVIN E. WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY 
248–49 (Wiley 1964). 
 78.  Id.  
 79.  Peter H. Rossi, Emily Waite, Christine Bose, and Richard Berk, The Seriousness of 
Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences, AM. SOC. REV., 2 Vol. 39, 224–37 (1974). 
 80.  Id. 
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In 1998, Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, and 
Cass Sunstein used a similar methodology to create a measure of 
outrageous misconduct that might warrant an award of punitive 
damages.81 The authors asked coders to rate the outrageousness and 
punishment-worthiness of ten different personal injury fact patterns on 
a scale from 0 to 6 on two measures. On the outrage scale, 0 denoted 
“completely acceptable” behavior and 6 denoted “absolutely 
outrageous” behavior.82 On the punishment scale, 0 denoted “no 
punishment” as the appropriate level and 6 denoted “extremely severe 
punishment.”83 They too found that there was substantial consensus on 
judgments of the outrageousness of defendant conduct and the 
appropriate severity of punishment the defendant should receive.84 
2. Measuring Egregiousness of Connecticut Murders 
Following this well-established research tradition, I developed two 
similar measures of egregiousness for each of the 205 death-eligible 
cases in my dataset.85 For the first measure of egregiousness, which I 
call the “Composite Egregiousness Score,” I designed a scale based on 
the following four factors drawn from the relevant Connecticut capital 
felony statute and judicial decisions and asked coders to rate the 
egregiousness of each case for each of the factors on a scale from 1 to 
3, with 3 being high: 
1. Victim Suffering, considering 1) the intensity of suffering, as 
measured by the degree of physical pain and/or mental anguish, 
and 2) the duration of suffering; 
2. Victim Characteristics, considering 1) whether the victim was a 
law enforcement officer and 2) the vulnerability of the victim 
relative to the defendant, signaled by factors such as the victim’s 
age, any mental or physical disability from which the victim 
suffered, whether the victim was outnumbered by assailants, 
whether the defendant held a position of authority over the 
victim, and whether the victim was intoxicated or high; 
 
 81.  Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Cass R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage and Erratic 
Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49 (1998). Four years 
after this work was published, Kahneman, a psychologist by training and Princeton professor, won 
the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics.   
 82.  Id. at 57. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. Interestingly, Kahneman, Schkade, and Sunstein found that while there was widely 
shared agreement about the outrageousness of the studied conduct, the resulting assessment of 
punitive damages on a monetary scale did not reflect this underlying outrageousness. 
 85.  See Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation, supra note 76, at 11. 
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3. Defendant Intent/Culpability, considering a range of factors 
including 1) the defendant’s motive for committing the murder, 2) 
whether the death of the victim was planned, 3) whether the 
defendant acted rashly or in the heat of the moment, and 4) 
whether the defendant’s judgment was compromised by, for 
example, psychiatric problems, drugs, or intoxication; 
4. Number of Victims. I asked coders to indicate the number of 
deaths caused by the defendant, truncated at a maximum value of 
3.86 
I then summed the scores for each of the four component factors, 
so that the Composite Egregiousness score for a given case could range 
from 4 to 12 (henceforth referred to as the “4–12 Composite 
Egregiousness Scale”).87 
Second, I asked coders (eighteen law students from Yale and the 
University of Connecticut) to rate the overall egregiousness of each 
case on a scale from one to five, with five being high.88 The purpose of 
this second scale was to capture more general reactions to each case 
and to compensate for any over- or under-inclusiveness of the 4–12 
Composite Egregiousness Scale. For example, the murders of law 
enforcement officers may tend to receive lower scores on the 
Composite scale because each of these cases involved only one victim 
and these crimes rarely involved prolonged or brutal victim suffering.89 
If there is a widespread belief that murders of police officers are 
particularly egregious, notwithstanding the typically low number of 
victims and relatively low degree of victim suffering, then the Overall 
Egregiousness scale might better capture the egregiousness of such 
crimes.90 This one to five overall egregiousness measure is exactly 
analogous to the scales used in the work by Kahneman et al and the 
prior literature assessing the heinousness of crimes.91 
Critically, coders rated cases on the basis of fact summaries that 
were scrubbed of any reference to (1) the race of the victim and 
defendant, and (2) how the defendant was charged and sentenced.92 
 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  One reflection of the similarity between these two egregiousness measures is that the 
correlation of the average 4–12 egregiousness score and the average 1–5 egregiousness score 
(across our 18 coders) was .88. 
 91.  Kahneman et al., supra note 81, at 5. 
 92.  Id. 
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The goal was to include in the summaries sufficient information for 
coders to make judgments about the egregiousness of each case, but to 
exclude information that might bias their judgments. Each case 
summary included the basic facts of the case, as well as any relevant 
information about the defendant that might bear upon the defendant’s 
intent or mental state, such as expert or court findings of mental illness. 
One of the advantages of the egregiousness coding exercise was 
that I was able to average the egregiousness assessments for individual 
cases across eighteen different coders.93 Averaging across such a large 
number of coders who have all coded all 205 cases guarantees (1) a 
greater uniformity of evaluation than would be present if only a subset 
of cases were scored by the various coders, and (2) increased precision 
in the egregiousness scores in that the idiosyncratic views of individual 
coders would tend to cancel out. Of course, the meaningfulness of these 
results depends on how reliable these coding evaluations are in 
capturing the underlying egregiousness of the various crimes. It turns 
out that the egregiousness scores are highly reliable across the eighteen 
coders, as determined by the high degree of inter-coder agreement. 
Moreover, if one simply takes the correlation between the average 
egregiousness scores across our seven Yale coders versus the eleven 
University of Connecticut coders, it is extremely high: .91 for the 4-12 
Composite egregiousness measure and .85 for the 1-5 Overall 
egregiousness measure.94 
It is important to note that the data from the egregiousness scales 
reflect each coder’s views on the relative egregiousness of offenses. I 
did not ask coders what punishment they thought was appropriate for 
each offender. Thus, even a coder who believed that no offender should 
ever be sentenced to death, or that all murderers should be sentenced 
to death, would be able to rate the egregiousness of the cases in relation 
to each other. By having each coder score every case, I sought to 
determine whether the most egregious cases—the “worst of the 
worst”—were the ones in which the death penalty was imposed. 
Whether the coders’ general preferences for harsh or lenient 
punishment varied from that of the general population in Connecticut 
is largely irrelevant to this study, because only the relative 
egregiousness of different cases matters. There is no reason why the 
 
 93.  The egregiousness scores were calculated by averaging or otherwise amalgamating 
scores from eighteen coders—seven Yale Law students and 11 University of Connecticut law 
students. 
 94.  Author’s calculation. 
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relative scoring of cases should depend on coders’ overall political or 
sentencing preferences. Both liberals and conservatives would agree, 
for example, that killing three is worse than killing one, or that torture 
resulting in death is worse than a death caused when a stray bullet fired 
in the course of a robbery kills one of the other robbers. 
3. Were the Nine Sustained Death Sentences in Connecticut the 
Worst Crimes? 
The New York Times prepared a graphic capturing the results under 
the Comprehensive 4-12 Egregiousness measure, which is reprinted as 
Figure 1 below.95 Each box in the figure represents one of the 205 death-
eligible cases in Connecticut, and the associated egregiousness measure 
is shown along the horizontal axis. In the Kantian world, where all must 
die, every box would be shaded reflecting universal execution. If the 
death penalty were being reserved for the worst of the worst offenses 
within the category of death-eligible crimes, then we would expect to 
see the shaded boxes in the right tail of the distribution. In fact, only 
one case fell in that region, with the rest spread fairly widely across the 
full universe of cases. 
  
 
 95.  Lincoln Caplan, The Random Horror of the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/opinion/sunday/the-random-horror-of-the-death-
penalty.html. 
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Figure 1 
In making the argument that the death penalty in Connecticut had 
not been limited to those within the class of death-eligible cases that 
were the worst of the worst, Justice Breyer summarized the result of 
my study as follows: 
Application of the studies’ metrics made clear that only 1 of those 9 
defendants was indeed the “worst of the worst” (or was, at least, 
within the 15% considered most “egregious”). The remaining eight 
were not. Their behavior was no worse than the behavior of at least 
33 and as many as 170 other defendants (out of a total pool of 205) 
who had not been sentenced to death. 
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Such studies indicate that the factors that most clearly ought to 
affect application of the death penalty—namely, comparative 
egregiousness of the crime—often do not. Other studies show that 
circumstances that ought not to affect application of the death 
penalty, such as race, gender, or geography, often do.96 
B. The Attacks by Justices Scalia and Thomas on the Connecticut 
Death Penalty Study 
Justice Scalia mocked Justice Breyer’s citation of my Connecticut 
death penalty study with a derisive reference to any “system of 
metrics,” stating: 
Egregiousness is a moral judgment susceptible of few hard-and-fast 
rules. More importantly, egregiousness of the crime is only one of 
several factors that render a punishment condign—culpability, 
rehabilitative potential, and the need for deterrence also are 
relevant.97 
But Justice Scalia’s naked incantation that three additional factors 
are relevant to capital sentencing collapses upon reflection. We have 
already discussed that the findings of the National Research Council 
report essentially take deterrence off the table as a justification for the 
death penalty under the Atkins’ standard because there is simply no 
measurable contribution to be found.98 Moreover, for capital crimes in 
Connecticut, the only possible sentences are death and life without 
possibility of parole;99 thus, “rehabilitative potential” is not a major 
concern. Finally, “culpability” is undoubtedly a key element of 
egregiousness and indeed was the third factor in my Comprehensive 4-
12 egregiousness factor and clearly of central importance in any 
egregiousness measure.100 In other words, Justice Scalia has not 
identified any relevant factor that is not fully considered in my 
egregiousness measures. 
Perhaps the opinion of Justice Thomas better expresses Justice 
Scalia’s concern: 
The Donohue study, on which JUSTICE BREYER relies most 
heavily, measured the “egregiousness” (or “deathworthiness”) of 
murders by asking lawyers to identify the legal grounds for 
 
 96.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2760 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 97.  Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2748 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 98.  COMM. ON DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 33, at 2. 
 99.  CONN. GEN. STAT., § 53a-46a (g) (2005). 
 100.  Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation, supra note 76, at 65. 
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aggravation in each case, and by asking law students to evaluate 
written summaries of the murders and assign “egregiousness” scores 
based on a rubric designed to capture and standardize their moral 
judgments. Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut 
Death Penalty System Since 1973, Are There Unlawful Racial, 
Gender, and Geographic Disparities? 11 J. of Empirical Legal 
Studies 637, 644–645 (2014). This exercise in some ways 
approximates the function performed by jurors, but there is at least 
one critical difference: The law students make their moral 
judgments based on written summaries—they do not sit through 
hours, days, or weeks of evidence detailing the crime; they do not 
have an opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, to see the 
remorse of the defendant, to feel the impact of the crime on the 
victim’s family; they do not bear the burden of deciding the fate of 
another human being; and they are not drawn from the community 
whose sense of security and justice may have been torn asunder by 
an act of callous disregard for human life. They are like appellate 
judges and justices, reviewing only a paper record of each side’s case 
for life or death.101 
Justice Thomas’ recitation of obvious differences between the 
judgments of capital jurors and my coders fails to appreciate the 
demands of a social scientific study. I needed to evaluate all 205 death-
eligible cases in Connecticut, not just the 28 that went to a jury for a 
capital sentencing determination. Furthermore, I needed every one of 
my coders to evaluate all cases (unlike the single one that a capital jury 
would see) and to be screened from morally-irrelevant information 
about race and ethnicity (which of course the jury would observe and 
be influenced by). I discuss these issues below. 
1. The Need to Consider All 205 Death-Eligible Cases 
We can interpret Justice Thomas’ concerns in light of the reasons 
that the Connecticut death penalty study was undertaken. First, the 
study was trying to find out whether arbitrary factors (such as race and 
geography) were influencing capital outcomes and also whether the 
death penalty was being limited to the worst of the worst offenders. 
Knowing that a jury has rendered a death penalty verdict in the sole 
case in which it was empaneled reveals that twelve individuals have had 
an extended opportunity to consider some or all of the factors that 
Justice Thomas suggests. But such information tells us virtually nothing 
about the issues the Connecticut death penalty study was asked to 
 
 101.  Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2751 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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address. One needs some methodology for determining, for example, 
whether a jury was critically swayed by the race of the defendant or 
victim in making the judgment to execute a defendant. Furthermore, 
even if every capital jury acted perfectly in deciding who deserves to 
die, the question analyzed in the Connecticut death penalty study 
would not yet be answered. One also needs to know whether 
impermissible factors influence which cases even make it to capital 
sentencing hearing. In the most obvious illustration of this point, if 
prosecutors were only to bring to capital juries cases in which 
minorities killed whites, the capital regime would be fatally defective 
no matter how exquisite capital juries were in rendering their final 
sentence. 
Thomas asserts, “[r]elying on these studies to determine the 
constitutionality of the death penalty fails to respect the values implicit 
in the Constitution’s allocation of decision-making in this context.”102 
But while there is a constitutional mandate for jury decision-making, 
capital outcomes are also subject to other demands and we cannot 
evaluate whether there has been a violation of equal protection or of 
the Eighth Amendment without looking at the entire population of 
death-eligible cases. Thus, in 177 of the 205 death-eligible cases included 
in the Connecticut death penalty study, no jury evaluated the 
appropriate punishment for the death-eligible defendant for any of a 
number of reasons: the case was not capitally charged, the prosecutor 
chose not to seek the death penalty, or a guilty plea or some other factor 
diverted the case from a capital sentencing jury determination.103 A 
scientific study must look at all 205 cases in the population of death-
eligible cases (most of which will not entail a jury sentencing 
determination), and cannot blindly accept the 28 sentencing decisions 
that were rendered by a jury as somehow validating the entire capital 
process. 
At this point, we see that Justice Thomas has been overly simplistic 
in extolling the informational advantages available in jury assessments 
(by virtue of their extended exposure to details of the case before 
them) in order to criticize the reliance by my egregiousness coders on 
written summaries. My study gave eighteen coders written information 
on 205 death-eligible cases in Connecticut.104 A jury of twelve would be 
given more detailed information, but it would only be about a single 
 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation, supra note 76, at 641. 
 104.  Id. 
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case. Because a critical goal of the coding exercise is to provide a 
relative assessment of the egregiousness of the 205 cases, our eighteen 
coders had a much better sense of what cases were unusually egregious 
than any jury, which would only have information on one case, would 
possess. In other words, the egregiousness study not only had 50 percent 
more individuals looking at each case (albeit with less complete 
information), but each egregiousness coder had information on 205 
times as many cases as any juror would have. 
2. The Need to Screen out Certain Information from Coders 
Justices Scalia and Thomas also showed no understanding of the 
disadvantages posed by some of the information that was available to 
the jurors, but not to the egregiousness coders. Specifically, the 
egregiousness coders were not apprised of the race and ethnicity of the 
defendants and victims.105 This was of course a critical element of the 
study because justifying the validity of a jury sentence of death by 
virtue of the fact that the jury rendered that particular judgment 
eliminates the possibility of ascertaining whether that decision was the 
product of racial or ethnic bias. 
Moreover, if the summaries have adequately captured the critical 
details of the crime and the defendant, then stripping away the 
prejudicial, emotion-laden, and irrelevant information that is generated 
during the course of a criminal trial—in fact, many of the factors that 
Justice Thomas specifically extolled106—would actually aid in the 
process of generating valid egregiousness assessments. Unlike actual 
jurors, my coders were not influenced by inflammatory appeals or 
misconduct by prosecutors (or defense lawyers for that matter).107 Thus, 
even if one had unlimited funds and could assign eighteen coders to sit 
in on the entirety of every capital sentencing hearing (thereby perfectly 
replicating everything that the jury heard), it would not give us 
information on more than a small portion of the 205 cases (because of 
 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2750 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 107.  For example, during the penalty phase of the trial of current Connecticut death row 
inmate Richard Reynolds, the prosecutor John Connelly “made irrelevant and prejudicial 
references to the family of Williams [the deceased] during voir dire, cross-examination and closing 
arguments; invited the jury, during closing arguments to ignore the legal standards governing the 
determination of when to impose the death penalty; and injected his personal opinions and beliefs 
into his closing arguments.” State v. Reynolds, 836 A.2d 224, 333 (Conn. 2003). While the 
Connecticut Supreme Court pointedly rebuked Connelly for his misconduct, it did not reverse 
the death sentence. This was not an isolated instance of improper conduct by Connelly during 
capital sentencing hearings. Id. at 333 n.180. 
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the infrequency among death-eligible cases of capital sentencing 
hearings), nor would it provide the appropriately shielded information 
concerning the race and ethnicity of the defendant and victim. 
3. Responding to Justice Scalia’s Emotional Claims with Empirical 
Evidence 
Justice Scalia chastised Justice Breyer with the emotional claim that 
“I would not presume to tell parents whose life has been forever altered 
by the brutal murder of a child that life imprisonment is punishment 
enough.”108 He seems to suggest that Justice Breyer is implicitly 
sending this message to a stock of parents grieving over their murdered 
children. But for a host of reasons, very few parents whose children 
have been brutally murdered see the murderer executed. For example, 
in Connecticut, it is a capital felony to kill a child under age sixteen, and 
46 of the 205 death-eligible cases involved such a killing.109 Yet, only 
two of those 46 killings led to a sustained death sentence.110 In other 
words, Connecticut prosecutors and jurors are indeed telling 44 of 46 
parents with a brutally murdered child that “life imprisonment is 
punishment enough.” 
Perhaps this rare invocation of the death penalty for child murder 
in Connecticut serves a retributive rationale because the two worst of 
these cases led to death sentences? No. Indeed, many death-eligible 
child killings rated more egregious than the two crimes leading to a 
death sentence did not end up on death row in Connecticut. Under the 
Composite egregiousness measure, thirteen death-eligible child 
murders that did not generate the ultimate punishment were rated 
equally or more egregious to the two on death row. The comparable 
number of equally or more egregious cases under the Overall 
egregiousness measure was ten.111 While Scalia thought his emotional 
argument buttressed a retributive rationale for the death penalty, the 
empirical evidence on child murders once again highlights the 
retributive infirmity in Connecticut’s capital punishment regime. 
Without capital punishment, each horribly suffering parent could take 
comfort in knowing that the killer of his or her child had received the 
harshest punishment allowed by law. With it, 94 percent of the suffering 
 
 108.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2748 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 109.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-54b (2005). 
 110.  The two on death row were Todd Rizzo and Russell Peeler, who both had identical 
egregiousness scores of 9.56 on the Composite 4–12 measure and 4.28 on the Overall 1–5 measure. 
 111.  Author’s own calculation using data from Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation, supra 
note 76. 
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parents will not find that comfort, and many will be bewildered why 
their even more atrocious victimization was treated more leniently than 
the two cases that did receive the ultimate punishment. 
4. Justice Thomas’s Misguided Critique 
Justice Thomas also tries to make a broadside critique against the 
use of empirical studies, making the following incorrect and misleading 
statement: 
[T]he results of these studies are inherently unreliable because they 
purport to control for egregiousness by quantifying moral depravity 
in a process that is itself arbitrary, not to mention dehumanizing. 
One such study’s explanation of how the author assigned “depravity 
points” to identify the “worst of the worst” murderers proves the 
point well.112 Each aggravating factor received a point value based 
on the “blameworth[iness]” of the action associated with it. . . . 
Killing a prison guard, for instance, earned a defendant three 
“depravity points” because it improved the case for complete 
incapacitation, while killing a police officer merited only two, 
because, “considered dispassionately,” such acts do “not seem be a 
sine qua non of the worst criminals.” . . . (Do not worry, the author 
reassures us, “many killers of police officers accrue depravity points 
in other ways that clearly put them among the worst criminals.” . . . 
). Killing a child under the age of 12 was worth two depravity points, 
because such an act “seems particularly heartless,” but killing 
someone over the age of 70 earned the murderer only one, for 
although “elderly victims tug at our hearts,” they do so “less” than 
children “because the promise of a long life is less.” . . . Killing to 
make a political statement was worth three depravity points; killing 
out of racial hatred, only two . . . . It goes on, but this small sample 
of the moral judgments on which this study rested shows just how 
unsuitable this evidence is to serve as a basis for a judicial decision 
declaring unconstitutional a punishment duly enacted in more than 
30 States, and by the Federal Government.113 
What makes Justice Thomas’ statement deceptive is that it appears 
a paragraph after he explicitly stated that he deemed “the Donohue 
study [to be the one] on which JUSTICE BREYER relies most 
heavily.”114 It would be natural then to conclude that Justice Thomas’s 
criticism applies to my study, when it certainly does not. In a deft bait-
 
 112.  David McCord, Lightning Still Strikes, 71 BROOKLYN L. REV. 797, 833–34 (2005).  
 113.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2752 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 114.  Id. at 2751. 
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and-switch argument, Justice Thomas lashes out at a completely 
different study and criticizes that study for using a methodology that I 
specifically did not use.115 That is, I did not go through and assign 
“depravity points” to various crimes as the criticized study did (nor did 
any of the other egregiousness studies I cited above from Sellin and 
Wolfgang to Rossi et al to Kahneman et al).116 I find it troubling that—
in a capital case no less—Justice Thomas would attempt to discredit an 
empirical study on a basis that he almost certainly understood, or 
should have understood, did not apply. 
5. Giving Content to “the Worst of the Worst” 
Justice Thomas dismissed Justice Breyer’s arbitrariness analysis, 
stating: “[i]n my decades, on the Court, I have not seen a capital crime 
that could not be considered sufficiently “blameworthy” to merit a 
death sentence. . . . “117 It is a bit unclear what Justice Thomas is claiming 
here, but he is almost certainly confusing two distinct, albeit related, 
issues. The first relates to the absolute threshold level of egregiousness 
that establishes the basis for a constitutionally permissible sentence of 
death and the second relates to the relative egregiousness of the cases 
that actually are sentenced to death within that permissible range. The 
first point was addressed by the Supreme Court in Atkins in 2002, which 
stated that Godfrey v. Georgia, shows that “the culpability of the 
average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction 
available to the State.”118 Presumably, Justice Thomas means that all of 
the capital cases that he has seen at the Supreme Court are above this 
egregiousness threshold (a point about which most other Supreme 
Court justices have disagreed since 2002).119 
Justice Thomas ignores Justice Breyer’s second point that the way 
in which one limits arbitrariness in implementation and establishes that 
a capital regime is measurably advancing a retributive goal is to follow 
the dictates that Justice Souter noted in Roper v. Simmons that “within 
the category of capital crimes, the death penalty must be reserved for 
 
 115.  Id. at 2747–48. 
 116.  Sellin and Wolfgang, supra note 77, at 135; Rossi et al, supra note 79, at 225; Kahneman 
et al., supra note 81, at 51. 
 117.  Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2752 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 118.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002).  
 119.  Specifically, the six to three decision in Atkins, id., as well as the five to four decision in 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U. S. 551 (2005), ruled that cases before the court involving a “mentally 
retarded offender” and a murderer under 18 years of age were not sufficiently blameworthy to 
justify a constitutionally permissible sentence of death. Justice Thomas dissented in both those 
cases.  
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‘the worst of the worst.’”120 In other words, within the class of death-
eligible cases, the death penalty regime is operating arbitrarily—and 
not measurably furthering a retributive goal—if the penalty of death is 
not being reserved for the most egregious murders. 
An analogy may help to make the point. Assume that there were 
205 applicants for an exclusive club, of whom, only nine would be 
selected. If the relevant metric for acceptance were being very wealthy, 
a low enough threshold might enable all 205 candidates to satisfy the 
wealth standard for admission. In this analogy, Justice Thomas would 
be saying that all 205 candidates meet the wealth criteria for the club. 
But then, continuing the analogy, Justice Breyer would point out that if 
this club is very exclusive, the club would not want to accept the nine 
least wealthy applicants or even a randomly sampled nine candidates, 
but rather should select the nine wealthiest candidates. 
Similarly, even if Justice Thomas determined all nine of the 205 
death-eligible cases in the Connecticut study were sufficiently 
blameworthy to merit a death sentence under the first standard, he 
would presumably recognize the problems for a retributive rationale if 
Connecticut were to execute the nine lowest-egregiousness cases or just 
nine randomly selected cases. Rather than being limited to the worst of 
the worst, the death-penalty under these scenarios would be limited 
either to the nine least bad of the 205 death-eligible cases or just nine 
selected at random from the 205. In neither situation would the death 
penalty be measurably furthering a retributive goal since the heart of 
retribution—that the worst crimes receive the harshest—would be 
violated. 
Figure 1 clearly depicts a problematic distribution of capital 
sentencing under the Atkins standard. Perhaps Justice Thomas would 
argue that there is no way to differentiate the egregiousness of crimes, 
so the Figure 1 results are not meaningful. But this argument conflicts 
directly with both logic121 and the holdings of Godfrey, Atkins, and 
 
 120.  Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 121.  We have already noted that killing three is worse than killing one, a fact explicitly 
recognized in the Connecticut death penalty statute in establishing that a killing involving 
multiple victims qualifies as a capital felony. Similarly, every death penalty statute contains some 
grading language that can provide a basis for a death sentence when the crime is either “heinous, 
cruel, or depraved” or “outrageously vile or inhuman.” Indeed, most cases that result in a death 
sentence in Connecticut do so because the crime is deemed to fall within the “heinous, cruel, or 
depraved” statutory aggravating circumstance. See Donohue, Capital Punishment in Connecticut, 
1973-2007: A Comprehensive Evaluation from 4600 murders to One Execution 114 (2014), 
http://works.bepress.com/john_donohue/137/ (“This factor was found in ten of the twelve cases 
resulting in a death sentence, seven times as the sole aggravating factor and three times in 
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Roper, as well as with the abundant social science evidence establishing 
that there is a broad social consensus on the relative egregiousness of 
crimes.122 Indeed, Justice Thomas refutes any claim that the 
egregiousness of capital cases cannot be compared by deliberately 
selecting three particularly horrible murders for gruesome description 
(following in a misguided tradition blazed by Justice Scalia that I 
discuss below).123 And that is precisely my point: one can assess 
different levels of egregiousness, and if the death penalty is not limited 
to the worst cases, then it is operating in an arbitrary fashion rather than 
in a way that justifies on legitimate grounds the few cases that lead to 
execution versus the many that do not.124 
The respective anecdotes they report provide a telling contrast 
between Justices Thomas and Breyer. While Justice Thomas is moved 
by the horrors of three particularly egregious crimes, which he 
describes in detail to support the death penalty, Justice Breyer’s Glossip 
opinion recited the details of three of the six men exonerated from 
death row in 2014 alone as evidence of the danger of wrongful capital 
convictions.125 It is difficult to imagine under what social welfare 
function, society would be deemed to be better off by killing a few 
particularly bad defendants (who would otherwise serve life prison 
sentences) and a similar number of innocent defendants. With zero 
credible evidence of deterrence, Justice Breyer’s anecdotes are clearly 
focused on a much more important concern for the criminal justice 
system. 
One noteworthy difference between the separate Glossip opinions 
authored by Justices Scalia and Thomas is that Justice Scalia refrained 
from his earlier tendency to enthusiastically recite the horrific details 
of various capital crimes, leaving that chore to Justice Thomas. A likely 
explanation for this division of labor is that Justice Scalia had been 
badly embarrassed by his miscue in his famed skirmish with Justice 
 
conjunction with one or more other aggravating factors.”). The thousands of judicial decisions 
upholding death sentences under these (and other) provisions clearly show the factors that courts 
deem to render a case more or less egregious. 
 122.  See Sellin and Wolfgang, supra note 77; Rossi et al, supra note 79; Kahneman et al., 
supra note 81. 
 123.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. at 2752–53 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 124.  But if my claim that one can ascertain which crimes are most egregious is incorrect, then 
the effort to justify the constitutionality of the death penalty on retribution grounds fails for 
another reason. One cannot satisfy the Atkins standard that the death penalty “measurably 
contributes” to retribution if there is no basis for saying that one crime is more egregious than 
another. 
 125.  Id. at 2755 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Blackmun in Callins v. Collins in which he derided Blackmun’s concern 
for a death row inmate and his failure to reference “the case of the 11-
year old girl raped by four men and then killed by stuffing her panties 
down her throat. See McCollum v. North Carolina, . . . . How enviable a 
quiet death by lethal injection compared with that!”126 
Justice Scalia’s rhetoric was misguided in a number of ways. First, it 
is illogical to argue that the most egregious possible crime can provide 
support for the imposition of all death sentences. Justice Scalia stated: 
“Justice Blackmun begins his statement by describing with poignancy 
the death of a convicted murderer by lethal injection. He chooses, as 
the case in which to make that statement, one of the less brutal of the 
murders that regularly come before us . . . .”127 In other words, Justice 
Scalia understood that the degree of egregiousness of crimes leading to 
sentences of death can vary widely. Citing the most egregious murder 
as a justification for the death penalty would only make sense if the 
death penalty would only be applied to the most egregious crimes. Yet, 
Justice Breyer’s point is that, if one looks at the actual administration 
of capital regimes, the death penalty is not limited to “the worst of the 
worst offenders,” as the Supreme Court has said it must be.128 If Scalia 
wants to highlight the egregiousness of crimes to support retributive 
rationality of the death penalty, he should be establishing that the least 
egregious case leading to execution is (or at least tends to be) worse 
than the most egregious cases not resulting in execution. It scarcely 
needs pointing out that no such claim is even remotely plausible (as 
Figure 1 makes abundantly clear). 
Second, Scalia’s reference to the horrific killing of the eleven-year-
old girl,129 which he thought was buttressing his argument for the 
constitutionality of the death penalty, ironically underscored another 
problematic feature of capital punishment in the United States. The 
more heinous the crime, the greater the pressure to solve a case and the 
greater the likelihood that anger and emotion will undermine the 
capacity of the criminal justice system to correctly identify and 
 
 126.  Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring); McCollum v. North 
Carolina, 512 U.S. 1254 (1994). 
 127.  Id. at 1142. 
 128.  Breyer writes: “JUSTICE THOMAS catalogues the tragic details of various capital 
cases . . . (concurring opinion), but this misses my point. Every murder is tragic, but unless we 
return to the mandatory death penalty struck down in Woodson, . . .  the constitutionality of 
capital punishment rests on its limited application to the worst of the worst. . . . And this extensive 
body of evidence suggests that it is not so limited.” Glossip, 135 S.Ct. at 2762 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 129.  Callins, 510 U.S. at 1143 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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prosecute the perpetrator.130 As we now know, the death row inmate 
that Justice Scalia described—Henry Lee McCollum—was completely 
innocent (as confirmed by the DNA-identified actual perpetrator) and 
would have been executed if Justice Scalia’s opposition to the extensive 
array of appeals afforded to death row inmates had been heeded.131 
Remarkably, Justice Scalia actually flirted with the claim (in a 2009 
opinion in the Troy Davis case132) that it is constitutionally permissible 
to execute innocent convicts: 
This Court has never held that the Constitution forbids the 
execution of a convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial 
but is later able to convince a habeas court that he is ‘actually’ 
innocent. Quite to the contrary, we have repeatedly left that 
question unresolved, while expressing considerable doubt that any 
claim based on alleged ‘actual innocence’ is constitutionally 
cognizable.133 
One can only wonder at the plain meaning of “cruel and unusual 
punishment” if Justice Scalia’s claim has any substantive merit. 
In Glossip, Justice Scalia dismissed the concern that eliminating the 
death penalty will solve the problem of an enhanced risk of wrongful 
convictions for the most heinous crimes on the grounds that the 
defendants would then languish in prison with little hope of correction: 
The reality is that any innocent defendant is infinitely better of off 
appealing a death sentence than a sentence of life imprisonment … 
[because] the capital defendant will obtain endless legal assistance 
from the abolition lobby (and legal favor from abolitionist judges), 
while the lifer languishes unnoticed behind bars.134 
I assume that Justice Scalia’s use of the word “infinite” is intentionally 
hyperbolic,135 but it is unclear why he believed the Innocence Project 
 
 130.  Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in 
Capital Cases, 44 BUFFALO L. REV. 469, 474 (1996)  
 131.  McCollum was held on death row for 30 years prior to his DNA exoneration. Dahlia 
Lithwick, A Horrifying Miscarriage of Justice in North Carolina, SLATE (September 3, 2014), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/09/henry_lee_mccollum_cle
ared_by_dna_evidence_in_north_carolina_after_spending.html.   
 132.  Davis, 557 U. S. 952, 954 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 133.  Id at 955. 
 134.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2747 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 135.  For example, while I was working on the evaluation of the Connecticut death penalty, 
two murder convicts serving life terms were exonerated by DNA evidence after they had served 
more than two decades in Connecticut prisons. Miguel Roman, arrested in 1988, was prosecuted 
and convicted of the Carmen Lopez murder. After more than twenty years behind bars, Roman 
was exonerated by DNA evidence that was tested at the urging of the Connecticut Innocence 
Project. Roman was released from prison in December 2008, and Connecticut then prosecuted 
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would close its doors if capital punishment were eliminated. 
Presumably, it would then be able to devote more of its limited 
resources to trying to secure release for wrongfully convicted lifers. 
Executing an innocent person is a uniquely horrible prospect—recall 
Kant’s emphasis, frequently echoed by the Supreme Court, that death 
is different in kind from other punishments136—so one would expect 
considerable resources would be devoted to avoid this unusually 
lamentable, and irreversible, outcome. 
C. Most Sentenced to Death Will not be Executed 
Justice Breyer also cites some particularly compelling descriptive 
statistics that further undermine the claim of retributive benefit: 
Consider, for example, what actually happened to the 183 inmates 
sentenced to death in 1978. As of 2013 (35 years later), 38 (or 21% 
of them) had been executed; 132 (or 72%) had had their convictions 
or sentences overturned or commuted; and 7 (or 4%) had died of 
other (likely natural) causes. Six (or 3%) remained on death row. 137 
When 75 percent of those who are sentenced to death are not 
executed,138 it is hard to see how this system could possibly be thought 
to measurably contribute to retribution. Every sentence of death—
indeed, every capital prosecution—involves an enormous marshalling 
of a complex and protracted legal process with its attendant emotional 
strain on the parties, their families, and the criminal justice system. That 
this lumbering machinery of death must be laboriously engaged for the 
wide pool of cases for which a death sentence was sought to generate a 
relatively small percentage of capital sentences that is then 
 
Pedro Miranda for the murder of Lopez based on a DNA match of the evidence that exculpated 
Roman.  Miranda was convicted of a capital felony in this case in 2011. See Alaine Griffin, State 
of Connecticut Awards $6 Million to Miguel Roman, Wrongly Imprisoned for Years, HARTFORD 
COURANT (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.courant.com/breaking-news/hc-miguel-roman-wrongfully-
imprisoned-award-0209-20160208-story.html.  
Kenneth Ireland was convicted of the 1986 rape-murder of Barbara Pelkey. In 2009, 
however, the intervention of the Connecticut Innocence Project led to Ireland being cleared by 
DNA evidence, after he had spent more than 21 years in prison. Four months later the state 
arrested Kevin Benefield for the murder, based on a DNA match. See Bill Leukhardt & David 
Owens, DNA Finds New Suspect in ‘86 Slaying, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 30, 2009, at A1; 
Alaine Griffin, Kevin Benefield Convicted of 1986 Murder for Which Another Man Served 21 
Years in Prison, HARTFORD COURANT (Jan. 18, 2012), http://articles.courant.com/2012-01-
18/news/hc-benefield-pelkey-0119-20120118_1_barbara-pelkey-connecticut-innocence-project-
kenneth-ireland. 
 136.  Kant, supra note 64, at 87. 
 137.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 138.  Tracy L. Snell, Capital Punishment 2013–Statistical Tables, 19 BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 
(2014). 
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dramatically reduced to a yet smaller number of executions 
underscores Justice Breyer’s view that massive resources are being 
expended and social costs imposed to pursue a system that serves no 
obvious penological justification while being highly morally and 
constitutionally contentious. 
III.  RACIAL DISPARITY IN CAPITAL OUTCOMES 
Furman v. Georgia139 catalyzed tremendous academic attention on 
the relationship between race and capital sentencing. There is now an 
expansive empirical literature—analyzing numerous states across the 
country—presenting compelling evidence that race influences the 
death penalty decisions of prosecutors and jurors. Justice Breyer 
referenced a few of the studies in this literature, but he only scratched 
the surface of the voluminous body of research. 
A.  The Baldus Study 
The seminal work in this literature—Equal Justice and the Death 
Penalty140—was conducted by a research team led by Professor David 
Baldus that examined capital sentencing in Georgia. The Baldus study 
investigated the effect of race on decisions throughout the charging and 
sentencing process by analyzing a large stratified random sample of 
1,066 defendants selected from the universe of cases of the 2,484 
defendants who were charged with homicide and subsequently 
convicted of murder or voluntary manslaughter in Georgia in the years 
from 1973 to 1979.141 The researchers then weighted this sample, which 
included 127 defendants who had been sentenced to death,142 to 
evaluate the effect of race on capital sentencing in the case universe as 
a whole. 
Baldus included 39 specific features of each crime as explanatory 
variables in his base regression model designed to explain capital 
sentencing using the entire death-eligible sample. Importantly, the 
model controlled only for features of the crime itself, rather than the 
system’s treatment of the defendant following his/her arrest.143 This is 
 
 139.  408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 140.  DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE G. WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI JR., EQUAL 
JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (Northeastern Univ. 
Press 1990) [hereinafter Equal Justice and the Death Penalty]. 
 141.  Id. at 45, 67 n.10. 
 142.  Id. at 45. 
 143.  Id. at 46–50, 57–59. 
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true not only for the base model, but also in Baldus’s set of extended 
models, including as many as 230 explanatory variables.144 
This comprehensive analysis showed that defendants convicted of 
murdering a white victim were statistically significantly more likely 
than defendants convicted of murdering a black victim to be sentenced 
to death.145 Baldus’s logistic regression model that included 39 
legitimate variables became the core piece of evidence regarding race-
of-victim discrimination in McCleskey v. Kemp.146 It showed that the 
odds that defendants convicted of murdering a white victim would be 
sentenced to death were 4.3 times the odds that defendants convicted 
of murdering a black victim would be sentenced to death.147 This 
relationship was statistically significant at the .005 level.148 
The Baldus team then went on to examine how the race of the 
defendant and victim interacted to influence capital sentencing 
outcomes.149 The study found that, controlling for egregiousness, cases 
involving black defendants and white victims were substantially more 
likely to result in a death sentence than cases involving other racial 
combinations of defendant and victim race.150 
B.  Other Pre-1990 Studies of Racial Disparity 
The regression models of the Baldus team that were described 
above uniformly demonstrated racial disparities in the administration 
of capital punishment in Georgia during the period of study. Numerous 
well-controlled studies from jurisdictions across the country have 
similarly found racial disparities in capital sentencing. In 1990, the 
United States General Accounting Office reviewed studies by 21 sets 
of researchers based on 23 distinct datasets and summarized the then-
existing literature, as follows: 
In 82 percent of the studies, race of victim was found to influence 
the likelihood of being charged with capital murder or receiving the 
death penalty, i.e., those who murdered whites were found to be 
more likely to be sentenced to death than those who murdered 
blacks. This finding was remarkably consistent across data sets, 
 
 144.  See id. at App. L, 612–15. 
 145.  Id. at 656–70. 
 146.  McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 279 (1987). 
 147.  Equal Justice and the Death Penalty, supra note 140, at 319–320. 
 148.  Id. at 319–20. For a list of the included variables, see Equal Justice and the Death Penalty, 
supra note 140, at 630–31. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. 
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states, data collection methods, and analytic techniques. The finding 
held for high, medium, and low quality studies. . . . [Our] synthesis 
supports a strong race of victim influence.151 
C.  Ten Post-1990 Studies Examining Racial Disparities in 8 States and 
2 Counties 
Findings of racial disparities in the administration of capital 
punishment are similarly robust in the post-1990 literature. Table 1 
presents the regression results of ten such methodologically rigorous 
studies on the effect of victim race on capital sentencing outcomes (the 
Baldus study results on Georgia are shown in Row 2 of Panel A). The 
relative probabilities in this Table were generated by regression 
analyses that controlled for variables that may affect decisions related 
to capital sentencing.152 
Table 1 summarizes the evidence concerning racial disparity in 
capital sentencing from eight different states as well as for two counties 
that are particularly active in employing the death penalty. The major 
finding is that defendants convicted of murdering a white victim face 
considerably higher odds of being sentenced to death than similarly-
situated defendants convicted of murdering a black victim.153 At the 
state level, these relative odds range from roughly 2.5 to 4.5, with only 
Ohio below that level at 1.66, which is roughly the level observed in 
Harris County, Texas.154 The ratio of 37.04 for East Baton Rouge is 
strikingly large. 
 
 151.  GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH 
INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 3, 5, 6–6 (1990), 
http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat11/140845.pdf. 
 152.  See infra text accompanying notes 155–64. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. 
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 155. Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, The Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors on 
Death Sentencing for California Homicides, 1990-1999, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 35 (2005). 
 156.  See Equal Justice and the Death Penalty, supra note 140, at 319–20. 
 157.  Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Choosing Those Who Will Die: Race and the 
Death Penalty in Florida, 43 FLA. L. REV. 28 (1991).  
 158.  Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Region, and Death Sentencing in Illinois, 
1988-1997, 81 OR. L. REV. 39, 95 (2002). 
 159.  Raymond Paternoster et al, Justice by Geography and Race: the Administration of the 
Death Penalty in Maryland, 1978-1999, 4 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1, 36 
(2004). Additionally, their regression analysis controlling for a wide range of case characteristics 
revealed that black-on-white murders are significantly more likely to result in a death sentence 
than black-on-black and white-on-white murders.  This is consistent with the raw Maryland data 
shown in Table 2, below. 
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D. Two National Studies of Racial Disparity 
In a sophisticated national-level study, Explaining Death Row’s 
Population and Racial Composition, researchers Blume, Eisenberg, and 
Wells analyzed data on murders and the composition of death row from 
1977 through 1999 in the 31 states that admitted ten or more defendants 
to death row during this time period.165 This comprehensive study 
 
 160.  Jonathan R. Sorensen & Donald H. Wallace, Capital Punishment in Missouri: 
Examining the Issue of Racial Disparity, 13 BEHAV. SCIENCES & L. 61 (1995). 
 161.  Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Death Sentencing in North Carolina 
1980-2007, 89 N.C. L. REV. 2119 (2011); see also Isaac Unah, Choosing Those Who Will Die: The 
Effect of Race, Gender, and Law in Prosecutorial Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in Durham 
County, North Carolina, 28 MICH. J. RACE & L. 135 (2009) (“Durham county prosecutors are 
43% more likely to seek the death penalty when a Black defendant kills a White victim compared 
to a situation where a Black defendant kills a Black victim.”). 
 162.  Marian R. Williams & Jefferson E. Holcomb, Racial Disparity and Death Sentences in 
Ohio, 29 J. OF CRIM. JUST., 211, 215 tbl.3 (2001). 
 163.  Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Death Sentencing in East Baton Rouge Parish, 71 
LA. L. REV. 647, 669 (2011). The county (or “parish”) studied in Louisiana, East Baton Rouge, 
provides important insight into capital sentencing in the state. Of the 84 people on death row in 
Louisiana at the end of 2009, 16 were convicted and sentenced in East Baton Rouge Parish—
more than in any other parish in the state. Moreover, the composition of East Baton Rouge’s 
contribution to death row is strikingly monochromatic: All 16 of the parish’s death row inmates 
are black. Id. at 650.   
 164.  Scott Phillips, Legal Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment, 99 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 717, 746 (2009). The Texas county examined in this study, Harris County, also 
provides considerable insight into the relationship between race and capital sentencing. Harris 
County has executed more people since 1976 than any U.S. state other than Texas. Id. at 720.  
 165.  John Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Explaining Death Row’s 
Population and Racial Composition, J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 165, 169. 
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included 5,953 of the 5,988 (99.4%) persons admitted to death row in 
the U.S. between 1977 and 1999.166 The researchers obtained data on the 
characteristics of murders, the racial composition of death row, and 
several other legal and political dimensions.167 They then compared the 
overall population of murderers to the death row population along a 
number of dimensions to determine which factors are related to the 
likelihood of being convicted of capital murder and placed on death 
row.168 
The researchers found that variation in black representation on 
death rows in states across the country was powerfully influenced by 
the proportion of all murders that involve a black offender and a white 
victim.169 This finding that black on white murders were treated more 
harshly than other types of murders was statistically significant at the 
.01 level.170 
Blume, Eisenberg, and Wells also calculated the rate at which 
murder cases involving different combinations of defendant and victim 
race resulted in death sentences for the eight states for which they had 
this complete data for the period from 1977-2000.171 Table 2 displays 
this data and shows that cases involving a black offender and a white 
victim are far more likely to result in the offender being placed on 
death row than cases involving other combinations of offender and 
victim race. Note that the combination of a black offender and a white 
victim leads to a death sentence at a rate from roughly three to 23 times 
the rate seen in black offender-black victim cases. The racial disparities 
in capital sentencing in the listed states are glaringly large and 
statistically significant at conventional levels.172 
A recent study by Harvard economics professor Alberto F. Alesina 
and his coauthor Eliana La Ferrara entitled A Test of Racial Bias in 
 
 166.  Id. at 169. 
 167.  Id. at 168–171. 
 168.  See id. at 181, 183, 185, 191, 197. 
 169.  Id. at 193–94. 
 170.  Id. at 190–91. 
 171.  Id. at 197. 
 172.  For each of the four race of defendant and victim categories, Table 2 provides the raw 
proportion that is sentenced to death. Conceivably, the black on white murders could be treated 
more harshly than black on black murders because the former are more egregious. Importantly, 
this was not found to be the case in Georgia. See Equal Justice and the Death Penalty, supra note 
140, at 656–70. Similarly, my Connecticut death penalty regression analysis for both capitally 
charging and sentencing shows that the harsher treatment of black on white murders is not 
explained by the level of egregiousness of the crimes. See Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation, 
supra note 76, at 644–645; infra Tables 6–7 for capital sentencing. One can see the results for 
capital charging in Tables 4–6 of this article, infra. 
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Capital Sentencing provides additional support for the Blume et al 
findings.173 The paper proposes a novel test of racial bias in capital 
sentencing based upon patterns of judicial errors in lower courts that 
vary according to the race of the defendant and victim.174 Looking at 
nationwide data from 1973-1995, the authors once again find robust 
evidence that minority on white murders are treated significantly more 
harshly than minority on minority murders.175 
E. The Nature of Racial Bias in Capital Punishment 
The studies discussed in the previous section provide strong 
evidence that minority defendants who kill white victims are treated 
more harshly by capital regimes, even controlling for possible 
explanations such as the egregiousness of the crime. An important 2006 
study provides insight into the nature of this racial bias. 
 
 173.  Alberto F. Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, A Test of Racial Bias in Capital Sentencing, 104 
AM. ECON. REV. 3397 (2014). 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
DONAHUE (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/2016  4:04 PM 
2016] EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 91 
Table 2. Capital Sentencing Rates by Race of Defendant and Victim 
in 8 States (1977-2000) 
*Note: The data for Arizona combines Blacks and Hispanics into a 
single “minority” category. Thus, the numbers in the last row of the 
table for Arizona Black Offender and Black Victim cases also includes 
Hispanic offenders and victims. 
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Using a dataset collected by David Baldus, Jennifer Eberhardt and 
her fellow researchers analyzed over 600 death-eligible cases in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania between 1979 and 1999.176 Forty-four of the 
cases involved a black defendant and white victim; another 308 had a 
black defendant and a black victim.177 Over 40 (mostly white) Stanford 
undergrads rated “the stereotypicality of each Black defendant’s 
appearance,” using whatever indication they felt appropriate.178 The 
study found that “stereotypically black” defendants who had been 
convicted of murdering a white victim were more likely to receive a 
death sentence.179 Specifically, “24.4% of those Black defendants who 
fell in the lower half of the stereotypicality distribution received a 
death sentence, whereas 57.5% of those Black defendants who fell in 
the upper half received a death sentence.”180 
What establishes that this finding represents racial bias in the 
capital punishment regime is the fact that when a black defendant was 
accused of killing a black victim, the defendant’s “stereotypical 
blackness” did not predict a sentence of death.181 In other words, it is 
not something intrinsic to “stereotypical black” defendants that makes 
them more likely to be sentenced to death, but rather how the system 
processes their cases when race becomes salient, as it apparently does 
in inter-racial killings. 
F.  Justices Scalia and Thomas in Glossip on Racial Disparities 
Given the strength of the evidence showing such widespread racial 
disparities in capital outcomes, one would imagine that the opinions of 
Justices Scalia and Thomas in Glossip would address this troubling 
issue in detail.182 In fact, Justice Scalia’s ode to the death penalty that 
purports to refute the major points of Justice Breyer’s opinion makes 
not a single reference to race or racial discrimination.183 Justice Thomas 
 
 176.  Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al, Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black 
Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCH. SCI. 383, 383–85 (2006).   
 177.  Id. at 384. 
 178.  Id.  
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  See id. 
 182.  In Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986), Justice White’s majority opinion vacating a 
death sentence for a black defendant convicted of killing a white victim expressed concern that 
juror discretion in considering mitigation evidence provides “a unique opportunity for racial 
prejudice to operate but remain undetected.” 
 183.  Right from the start of his tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia showed little 
concern about the influence of race on capital outcomes. As my colleague Mugambi Jouet has 
noted, during the oral argument in McCleskey v. Kemp shortly after he became a justice, Justice 
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addresses the issue in a single sentence characterized by another of his 
bait and switch arguments.184 
Specifically, Justice Thomas ignored all of the evidence discussed 
above concerning racial disparities in capital punishment. He 
responded to Justice Breyer’s reliance on my Connecticut study by 
stating that “the primary explanation [the Donohue] regression 
analysis revealed for the gap between the egregiousness scores and the 
actual sentences was not the race or sex of the offender or victim, but 
the locality in which the crime was committed.”185 Though Justice 
Breyer found this geographic influence to be evidence of arbitrary 
implementation of the death penalty, Justice Thomas thought this was 
not a problem. Two points should be made on this issue. 
First, while geography was the single most important explanation 
for who received the Connecticut death penalty—far more important 
than the comparative egregiousness of the crime, which Justice Breyer 
argued should be paramount—the second most potent factor was race 
(with minorities who killed whites treated far more harshly).186 Justice 
Thomas’ insinuation that racial bias was not a serious problem in 
Connecticut’s capital punishment regime because geography was a 
more potent factor is like saying that cancer isn’t a problem because 
cardiovascular disease kills more Americans. 
Second, the geographic factor in Connecticut capital sentencing 
was driven by the fact that the State’s Attorney in Waterbury (John 
Connelly) was particularly enthusiastic about administering the death 
penalty—to a degree that troubled some Connecticut attorneys and 
Supreme Court justices.187 The Waterbury prosecutor was actually 
 
Scalia derisively asked: “What if you do a statistical study that shows beyond question that people 
who are naturally shifty-eyed are to a disproportionate extent convicted in criminal cases, does 
that make the criminal process unlawful?” Mugambi Jouet, The Human Toll of Antonin Scalia’s 
Time on the Court, SLATE (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
jurisprudence/2016/02/antonio_scalia_made_america_s_incarceration_problem_worse.html. 
 184.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2750, 2752, reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 20 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation, supra note 76, at 663. 
 187. “Twice the Connecticut Supreme Court commented disapprovingly on [Connelly’s] 
unprofessional manner during the penalty phase of a capital punishment case. . . . Norm Pattis, a 
Waterbury trial attorney (who defended Connelly’s friend Martin Minella in the ensuing 
corruption charges), wrote in his political eulogy for Connelly that ‘his almost combative glee in 
sending people to the death house troubled me.” See Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation, supra 
note 76, at 691–693. 
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forced to resign in 2011 following a federal corruption investigation,188 
which underscores that single individuals often play a huge role in 
generating death sentences even when their judgment can be highly 
questionable. The Connecticut experience with the imposition of death 
sentences—to individuals who Connecticut prosecutors still fought to 
execute despite the State’s prospective abolition of the death penalty 
in 2012 and the subsequent Connecticut Supreme Court decision in 
Santiago striking down the death penalty as violative of the state’s 
constitution in August 2015—is an uncomfortable one for those who 
believe in a government of laws rather than a government of men.189 
G.  Racial Disparities in Connecticut Capital Outcomes 
Despite the strong evidence in the Baldus Report that race 
influenced capital outcomes, the trial judge in McCleskey, a former 
prosecutor who clearly was searching for reasons to find fault with the 
Baldus study, rejected its findings as statistically unsound.190 A similar 
dynamic existed in Connecticut when the trial judge—also a former 
prosecutor—labored to avoid crediting the evidence of racial 
disparities in Connecticut’s capital punishment regime. Just as Justice 
Scalia in Glossip side-stepped the issue of racial discrimination, the trial 
judge in Connecticut ignored the strong evidence of racial disparity in 
capital charging without even a word of discussion.191 The evidence was 
viewed quite differently when the issue came before the Connecticut 
Supreme Court in State v. Santiago two months after Glossip, as 
 
 188.  See Edmund H. Mahoney, Waterbury State’s Attorney John Connelly Pressured to Leave 
Office; Will Retire Feb. 1, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 14, 2011. 
 189.  After the decision in Santiago ruled the imposition of the death penalty to be 
unconstitutional, the State sought re-hearing and was rebuffed. Since one Justice of the 
Connecticut Supreme Court who had been a member of the majority retired shortly after Santiago 
was decided, the State refused to accept the Santiago decision apparently hoping the new Justice 
would side with the three dissenting Justices. On January 7, 2016, in the case of State v. Peeler, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court allowed the State to argue that Santiago should be overturned. 
Alaine Griffin, Death Penalty Back Before State Supreme Court, HARTFORD COURANT (Jan. 7, 
2016), http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-death-penalty-in-connecticut-20160107-
story.html; see State v. Peeler, 321 Conn. 375 (Conn. 2016). The prosecutorial push for execution 
finally ended on May 26, 2016 when the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the Santiago decision 
in a 5-2 per curiam opinion in the Peeler case. Id. 
 190.  McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 379-80 (N.D. Ga. 1984). Interestingly, the U.S. 
Supreme Court, perhaps recognizing the strength of the Baldus study, decided to presume its 
statistical soundness, but then rejected it on the legal grounds that statistical evidence did not 
satisfy the requirement of showing intentional racial discrimination in the particular case before 
it. Remarkably, the author of the 5-4 McCleskey decision subsequently conceded that he should 
have voted the other way in that case. He also acknowledged that he had been hampered by his 
limited understanding of statistics as he evaluated the claims of racial disparity.   
 191.  See Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation, supra note 76, at 639– 40. 
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indicated in the concurring opinion of Justices Norcott and McDonald: 
[T]he available evidence supports the conclusion that, when 
members of minority groups who offend against whites are charged 
with capital crimes and subjected to execution at far greater rates 
than other defendants who commit comparable crimes, those 
disparities are a result of racial biases and cannot be explained away 
by other, innocuous factors.192 
The opinion also noted: 
Perhaps the most striking finding was that minority defendants who 
committed capital eligible felonies against white victims in 
Connecticut were charged with capital crimes in 85 percent of cases, 
whereas prosecutors only sought a capital conviction approximately 
60 percent of the time for crimes with minority victims.193 
 
1.  The Racial Disparity in Capital Charging 
Indeed, the trial evidence of racial disparity in capital charging was 
overwhelming, and all of the pre-trial evidence presented by both the 
experts for the death row inmates (me) and the State (Stephan 
Michelson) over many years—with a single, temporary and erroneous 
exception—supported the conclusion that minority defendants who 
killed white victims were charged at substantially higher rates than 
minority defendants who killed minority victims.194 The momentary 
exception was that Michelson’s final pre-trial regression seemed to 
contradict the finding of racial disparity in capital charging, but this 
 
 192.  State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 140, 152 reconsideration denied, 319 Conn. 912 (2015) 
(Norcott and McDonald, Js., concurring). 
 193.  Id. at 159. 
 194.  Michelson testified at trial that two years earlier after having completed seven reports, 
he had told the prosecutors that his regression analysis showed that there was a racial disparity in 
capital charging: 
Q Now, you told us . . .  at the beginning of your testimony, on direct examination, that 
when you see things and your client wants to know, you tell your client. So did you tell 
your client . . . I’ve done seven reports now, and here we are August 20, 2010. I’ve 
corrected my databases. I’ve amplified my databases. I’ve had opportunity to review. 
I’ve incurred over $655-thousand worth of time, and I personally, Stephan Michelson, 
agree with the petitioners’ claim and the petitioners’ expert that there is statistically 
significant disparity in capital felony charging based on [minority] race of defendant and 
race of victim being white in Connecticut; that there is that same disparity based on 
gender in capital felony charging in Connecticut, and there is that same disparity based 
on geography in Connecticut? Did you tell your client that? 
A Of course. 
Trial Transcript at 140, In Re: Racial Disparity v. Commisioner of Correction, (Conn. Super Ct. 
2012) (No. cvos-4000632) (emphasis supplied) (on file with author) [hereinafter Trial Transcript]. 
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anomalous finding was due to his mis-coding error of the multiple 
victims’ variable.195 When his coding error was corrected, the large and 
statistically significant racial disparities were clearly evident. 
But the issue did not end there. In perhaps one of the most 
ludicrous examples of misuse of regression in a judicial setting, the 
state’s expert responded mid-trial to the revelation of his coding error 
by trying a two-part ploy to wriggle out of the clear finding that 
minority on white crimes were capitally charged at a substantially 
higher rate than minority on minority crimes.196 First, he claimed that 
because he had made a coding error in the identifier of the multiple 
victim variable (which he had coded correctly in 8 previous reports), it 
was now necessary to conduct in mid-trial an entirely new regression 
analysis (rather than adhere to his own corrected results, which 
confirmed the racial disparity that had always been present in his 
earlier reports).197 Second, he then introduced a new regression which 
he claimed showed no racial impact, but this was only because his 
regression dropped the identifier of whether the case involved a 
minority killing a white.198 In other words, dropping the key variable 
 
 195.  Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation supra note 76, at 640, 657. 
 196.  Id. at 658. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. Michelson also testified that with his new mid-trial revision of a capitally charging 
regression he had never run a regression in which a minority on white identifier variable had been 
included.  In fact, he had done so as our discovery revealed. Consider the following exchanges 
from the trial when Michelson introduced “Exhibit O,” which he claimed included all of the 
regressions he had run after his multiple victim error in his capital charging regression (D03) had 
been pointed out to him: 
ATTY. GOLUB: Is this witness testifying that this document, Ex. O, contains all of the 
[regressions] on charging with respect to the changes to D03. . . .  
THE WITNESS: That’s exactly what I mean. 
ATTY. GOLUB: Is this witness testifying under oath that this document, Ex. O, that 
he’s just identified, contains all of the regressions he did in response to the error found 
in D03? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, that’s what I’m testifying. 
Later, on cross-examination, Michelson told a different story, when we showed him the regression 
he had performed but not included in Ex. O, which both included a black on white variable and 
showed once again the considerable racial disparity in capital charging:  
 
ATTY. GOLUB: The document that . . . you testified under oath contained all of your 
regressions in connection with the correction to D03, that document did not include the 
regression with black defendant/white victim, did it, sir? 
A  Apparently not. 
Q  When you say apparently not, why is that only apparently not? It didn’t, did it? 
A  Well, fine. No. 
Q  And you knew it didn’t, didn’t you? 
A  No. No, I didn’t. I thought. . . . What I said was what I thought it would be until I 
actually read it. 
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needed to identify racial disparity made the race effect go away in the 
same way that telling a child to close her eyes makes the world 
disappear. One must assume that the State’s expert resorted to such 
tactics because he perceived (apparently correctly) that the trial judge 
would either not be able to understand these statistical shenanigans or 
would ignore them because of a desire to overlook evidence of racial 
bias. Again, this is a troubling commentary on the use of statistical 
evidence in legal proceedings. 
Remarkably, the trial judge wrote an opinion rejecting claims of 
racial disparity that entirely ignored the overwhelming evidence of 
racial bias in capital charging.199 Not a single mention was made of 
either my regression analysis showing the striking racial disparity in 
capital charging, nor the clear evidence of racial disparity in 
Michelson’s corrected capital-charging regression (let alone his 
questionable efforts to disguise this clear evidence).200 
2.  The Connecticut Supreme Court Ends the Death Penalty 
The decision in Santiago striking down the Connecticut death 
penalty as unconstitutional in the wake of the legislature’s 2012 
prospective abolition of capital punishment was momentous. Also 
striking was the concurrence by Justices Norcott and McDonald that 
assessed the “abundant . . . statistical evidence [that] strongly suggests 
that racial disparities in the capital punishment regime exist in 
Connecticut—as elsewhere—that cannot be accounted for by benign, 
nonracial factors.” Santiago seemed to represent the final chapter in 
what the concurrence called Connecticut’s “nearly 400 year struggle 
with the macabre muck of capital punishment litigation.”201 
After discussing numerous studies from around the country, and the 
findings from my study of the Connecticut death penalty system, the 
concurrence concluded, “[a] thorough and fair-minded review of the 
 
Q  Now that you’ve seen it? 
A  No, not now that I’ve seen it. You must have noticed the hesitation when we turned 
to the last page. 
Q I didn’t notice any hesitation, Dr. Michelson. I saw a person lying, but I didn’t notice 
any hesitation. 
Trial Transcript, supra note 194. 
 199.  See Trial Transcript, supra note 194. 
 200.  Indeed, even when the trial judge specifically addressed whether the Waterbury 
prosecutor was more likely to capitally charge death-eligible cases, he said nothing about whether 
there was evidence of racial disparity in capital charging. 
 201.  State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 140, 140-44, reconsideration denied, 319 Conn. 912 (2015) 
(Norcott and McDonald, Js., concurring). 
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available historical and sociological data thus strongly suggests that 
systemic racial bias continues to infect the capital punishment system 
in Connecticut in the post-Furman era.”202 This might be taken as a sign 
that the strength of good empirical work will carry the day and promote 
wise judicial decision-making. But some words of caution are in order 
both because we have seen that some judges have struggled with 
statistical evidence and can be misled by spurious claims, and because 
the attachment of some to the death penalty in spite of the evidence 
that has amassed about its ineffectuality, high cost, and problematic 
implementation means that extraordinary efforts are sometimes 
undertaken to revive it, even when it appears to have been finally killed 
off. I discuss both these points below. 
3. Michelson Tries to Cast Doubt on the Racial Disparity in 
Charging 
The 4-3 decision in State v. Santiago angered the Connecticut 
prosecutors who then tried to take advantage of the retirement of one 
of the members of the majority by resisting the Court’s decision.203 
Perhaps trying to influence this re-hearing of the questions that had 
been decided in Santiago, the State’s expert offered yet another 
attempt to cast doubt on the finding of racial disparity in capital 
charging in Connecticut.204 The new regression he supplied in this 
endeavor provides further evidence of how meaningless results can be 
generated when valid statistical protocols are ignored. Once these 
meaningless results have been introduced into a policy debate, 
however, they can be used by those with the type of cognitive delusion 
that characterized Justice Scalia’s credulous marshalling of empirical 
evidence in Baze and Glossip.205 
a. Michelson drops racial identifiers and manipulates the judicial 
district controls 
Table 3 reproduces the new Michelson regression that he devised 
after the Santiago decision to try to argue against the finding of racial 
 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  See supra note 189. 
 204.  Stephan Michelson, Slide 50, PowerPoint Presentation at “Symposium on Race and 
Arbitrariness in the Connecticut Death Penalty,” University of Conn. School of Law (Nov. 20, 
2015). Michelson presented his new capital charging regressions in a forum at the University of 
Conn. School of Law on November 20, 2015. 
 205.  See supra text accompanying notes 61–62. 
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disparity in capital charging.206 His table uses my sample of 205 death-
eligible cases, while dropping certain variables I employed and adding 
some others of his own. On its face, Michelson’s Table 3 regression finds 
that minorities who kill whites (identified in the first row of the table) 
are capitally charged at a rate 11 percentage points higher than all other 
crimes, controlling for 11 other variables that relate to where the crime 
occurred, the nature of the crime and the defendant, and whether the 
defendant was represented by a public defender.207 Because the racial 
effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels, Michelson 
apparently hopes to persuade others that the 11 percentage point racial 
disparity in capital charging seen in his Table 3 regression can be 
ignored. 
Instead, Michelson’s regression provides a textbook illustration of 
how one can improperly manipulate regression models to ostensibly 
achieve desired results that are both meaningless and misleading. The 
first problem to note is that Michelson dropped the full array of racial 
identifiers that both he and I had uniformly used in the many pre-trial 
versions of our respective reports. In Connecticut—and indeed as 
Baldus had found in Georgia, and Blume, Eisenberg, and Wells as well 
as Alesino and Ferrera found for the country as a whole—the strongest 
racial disparities are that minority defendants who kill whites are 
treated most harshly and minority defendants who kill minority victims 
least harshly.208 A regression exploring racial disparity in capital 
charging that does not include the full racial breakdown of the 
defendants and victims will not be able to identify such racial 
disparities.  
In Michelson’s last previous capital charging regression which he 
introduced at trial, he had controlled for the following judicial districts: 
New Haven, New Britain, and Danbury.209 One might wonder why 
 
 206.  Michelson, supra note 204. 
 207.  The second explanatory variable in Table 3 is the 1-5 egregiousness measure. The third 
variable in Michelson’s regression is the third measure of egregiousness that I created, which took 
advantage of the fact that the lawyers who had collected detailed information about each of the 
205 death-eligible cases had checked off the presence of a list of 23 special aggravators that 
included, among others, mutilation, multiple gunshot wounds, attempt to dispose of/conceal body 
after death, victim killed in the presence of family members or friends, physical details of the 
crime are unusually repulsive (e.g., victim drowned in own blood), and sexual assault of victim 
prior to killing. This special aggravating factors variable merely tallied the number of these factors 
that were present in a given case. 
 208.  See Equal Justice and the Death Penalty, supra note 140, at 319–20; Blume, Eisenberg & 
Wells, supra note 165, at 165; Alesina & Ferrara, supra note 173, at 3399. 
 209.  This Michelson trial regression is depicted in Table 5 of Donohue, An Empirical 
Evaluation, supra note 77, at 657. 
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Michelson had dropped two of these three districts and added a new 
one, so that in his new regression, he was only controlling for New 
Haven and Hartford. The reason for the switch becomes clear in the 
regression Table 4 below, which corrects Michelson’s Table 3 
regressions by including the complete set of racial identifiers and then 
uses his prior set of judicial district controls: had he done so he would 
have shown that when minority defendants kill white victims they were 
almost 20 percentage points more likely to be capitally charged. As the 
highlighted box shows, this finding is highly statistically significant, 
even exceeding the .01 level of significance. 
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b.  Controlling for all judicial districts 
Michelson’s selective inclusion and omission of variables to 
generate desired regression findings is a serious breach of appropriate 
statistical protocol. Table 4 clearly reveals that the judicial district 
controls that Michelson himself presented at trial clearly establish 
racial disparity in capital charging. Since the 2012 trial, Michelson has 
selectively added and subtracted judicial districts to his Table 3 
regression in an apparent attempt to disguise the racial disparity. When 
I simply restore the racial categories and control for all judicial districts 
so there can be no claim of cherry-picking of the explanatory variables, 
the statistically significant racial disparity is unmistakably present in 
Table 5. This is true without any further change in Michelson’s 
regression. The magnitude of the racial effect for minority on white 
crimes (versus minority on minority crimes) is over 16 percentage 
points with a p-value of .052.210 In other words, the racial disparity in 
 
 210.  See infra Table 5. Note there are many other problems and potential difficulties with 
Michelson’s Table 3 regression, including inappropriate variable selection and his use of OLS 
regression rather than the more appropriate logit model, but for now the point I want to highlight 
is that any dedicated search that simply combs through hundreds or even thousands of variables 
without any constraining theoretical rationale in order to try to weaken a regression finding (of 
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capital charging that was always evident in all ten of Michelson’s 
reports (correcting for his error in the multiple victims variable), as 
well as in his trial regression (when the minority on white variable is 
restored) and in all of my capital charging regressions is still 
unequivocally present.211 
c.  Adding a host of controls does not change the finding of clear 
racial disparity 
Everyone who works with regression analysis knows that if one can 
choose among a large enough number of explanatory variables 
unconstrained by any guiding theoretical principles, one can obscure 
 
racial disparity in charging in this case) violates the basic precepts of hypothesis testing and can 
only yield the type of spurious results that Michelson supplies and that Fisher so cogently warned 
against. See infra note 212. 
 211.  At times, Michelson has tried to justify excluding certain variables because they have 
low t-statistics. See Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation, supra note 76, at 668. If one alters the 
Table 5 regression by eliminating all variables with t-statistics less than one, the resulting racial 
disparity is virtually identical and the statistical significance of the minority on white variable is 
even greater. 
DONAHUE (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/2016  4:04 PM 
2016] EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 103 
true statistically significant effects by selectively including or omitting 
variables.212 Essentially, unprincipled (or simply misguided) variable 
selection can generate random perturbations in a particular coefficient 
estimate and if one just selects the variables in a way to always choose 
the random perturbation that cuts in a particular direction, one can 
reduce a true effect to statistical insignificance. 
In his widely cited paper, “Multiple Regression in Legal 
Proceedings,” the former MIT econometrician Frank Fisher addressed 
this problem and explained that one should specify one’s model in 
advance of looking at the data based on firm theoretical grounds for 
variable selection: Adding and deleting variables “by first looking at 
the data and then including those factors that appear correlated with 
the dependent variable is a recipe for spurious results.”213 Michelson’s 
cherry-picked Table 3 regression falls into this category and should 
serve as a cautionary tale. 
In my thirty years as an empirical researcher, I have seen few social 
scientific relationships as strongly robust as the racial disparity in 
capital charging in Connecticut. Indeed, Table 6 shows, as I testified at 
trial, that one can add a string of theoretically justified control 
variables—identifying whether the defendant or victim was female, 
whether the defendant had prior prison sentences or was a stranger to 
the victim, and controlling for multiple measures of the strength of the 
evidence—and the core conclusion remains unchanged and highly 
statistically significant. Table 6 shows that Connecticut prosecutors 
capitally charged minorities who killed white victims at a rate that is 20 
percentage points higher than the rate that they charged minorities 
who killed minorities.214 
 
 212.  See Franklin M. Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 
702, 713–14 (1980). 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  As Andrew Gelman observes, the pernicious tactic of inserting variables into regressions 
to obscure true effects has been employed for decades: “The statistician George L. Saiger from 
Columbia University received [Council for Tobacco Research] Special Project funds ‘to seek to 
reduce the correlation of smoking and diseases by introduction of additional variables’; he also 
was paid $10,873 in 1966 to testify before Congress, denying the cigarette-cancer link.” Andrew 
Gelman, Statistics for Cigarette Sellers, CHANCE, Vol. 25.3, 43, 45 (2012) 
http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/published/ChanceEthics4.pdf. 
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CONCLUSION 
If the Atkins standard for assessing the constitutionality of the 
death penalty is to be maintained, empirical evaluation will be at the 
heart of the case, as Justice Breyer’s opinion in Glossip adumbrates. In 
a perfect world, one would like judges to have enough quantitative heft 
to be able to evaluate the quality of statistical studies, but that is clearly 
an unrealistic goal. The skills needed to fully assess empirical studies 
are far beyond the capacity of most judges, as well as most legislators 
and policymakers. Moreover, to fully evaluate one of these statistical 
studies, one would need to have a very detailed knowledge of the data 
used and the intricacies of statistical modelling of criminal justice 
processes, which is a tall order for anyone but academics and policy 
analysts with sophisticated empirical training. 
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However, there are a number of practices that can aid judges and 
policymakers in evaluating statistical studies. At times, one might hope 
to glean some indication of reliability by assessing the quality of the 
academic journal in which a study appears and the education, training, 
reputation, and institutional affiliation of the study authors. 
Infrequently, meta-analyses by top experts such as the NRC report on 
deterrence and the death penalty can provide further guidance. 
Because the NRC critique was so overwhelmingly negative on the two 
statistical studies that Justice Scalia relied upon, I think the role of the 
academic is to offer a strong rebuke of his conduct in this matter. 
Especially on a matter of life and death, one would hope for more from 
a Supreme Court Justice than citations to studies discredited by a 
unanimous NRC panel and to a paper whose lead author has published 
a specific refutation of Justice Scalia’s prior conclusion based thereon. 
Justice Scalia is not alone in going astray in the domain of 
econometric evidence concerning capital punishment. We saw that the 
trial judge in McCleskey misappraised the value of the Baldus study 
showing of racial disparity in capital outcomes in Georgia, as did the 
trial judge evaluating the evidence of racial disparity in capital 
outcomes in Connecticut. Although both studies fared better at the 
appellate level, the dissenting justices in Santiago still made claims that 
were directly contradicted by the best empirical evidence.215 
Justice Scalia ended his opinion in Glossip with a rousing statement 
that because Justice Breyer advanced the view that the death penalty 
is unconstitutional, he “does not just reject the death penalty, he rejects 
the Enlightenment.” It is a lovely phrase but exactly the type of 
“specious reasoning and seductive eloquence” that Beccaria hoped to 
 
 215.  The dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Chase Rogers is a case in point. Rogers criticized 
the claim that the declining use of the death penalty was a factor undermining its constitutional 
validity by asserting that the “declining imposition of capital punishment may indicate that the 
death penalty is being employed precisely as was intended, to punish only the very worst of 
society’s criminals . . . “But this speculation is directly contradicted by the empirical evidence on 
exactly this point, as Justice Breyer noted in his Glossip dissent: the Connecticut death penalty 
did not limit its application to the worst of the worst offenders over the study period from 1973-
2007. This finding was true regardless of which of the three different egregiousness scales that I 
employed or whether one employed the egregiousness scale developed by the State’s expert.   
Similarly, the Chief Justice’s efforts to discern a deterrent value in executing death row 
inmates after the death penalty had been abolished prospectively by the Connecticut legislature 
stands on an even weaker foundation than Justice Scalia’s mythical deterrence claims. Again, the 
National Research Council report of 2012 finding no credible evidence of deterrence in even 
active executing states applies a fortiori to any deterrence claims asserted when no future criminal 
act could be punished by death in Connecticut. Again, the critical Atkins language should be 
invoked: executing convicts after prospective abolition cannot be deemed to “measurably 
contribute” to deterrence.   
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eliminate from discussions of criminal justice.216 The Enlightenment 
was characterized by advances in science and the rejection of the 
influence of tradition, prejudice, superstition, and myth. By his careful 
recitation of the empirical literature on the operation of the death 
penalty, Justice Breyer, like Justices Norcott and McDonald in the 
Santiago case, captured the best of the Enlightenment spirit of using 
human reason to understand the operation of an important American 
institution and illuminate its infirmities. Any judge who succeeds in 
properly evaluating the empirical evidence on capital punishment will 
find it difficult to sustain the validity of capital punishment under the 
Atkins standard that the death penalty is unconstitutional unless it 
“measurably contributes” to one or both of the goals of deterrence and 
retribution. The empirical evidence buttresses the view that capital 
punishment “is nothing more than the purposeless and needless 
imposition of pain and suffering.”217 
 
 
 216.  See supra text accompanying note 16. 
 217.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318–19 (2002). 
